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Thesis Abstract
In Chapter 1, a theory of optimal fund size in venture capital is developed. Fund
managers - the VCs - add value to the projects they finance, but their human capital
is scarce. A matching model is proposed where VCs span their nurturing activity over
more projects, and entrepreneurs, who own the projects, direct their search to VCs
based on their projects’ quality. The work provides necessary and sufficient conditions
for positive and negative assortative matching over VC attention and project quality
to emerge and shows when VCs fundraising decision is distorted by selection consid-
erations. The chapter ends with an investigation of the effects of entry of less skilled
intermediaries. By attracting the worse entrepreneurs, these new agents alleviate the
adverse selection problem associated to managing a larger fund. This offers a new
angle to think about policies encouraging entry in the venture capital industry.
In Chapter 2, the model developed in Chapter 1 is extended to a dynamic setting,
where projects need time to develop and produce returns. VCs can choose to enter
in a short-term contract with investors, giving them access to investors liquidity for
a given period of time, and an open credit relationship that allows them to raise
investors money at any point in time. The model illustrates a novel advantage of
closed, finite-horizon funds, which emerge in equilibrium even when they are socially
undesirable: they attract the best entrepreneurs, who value the most the exclusive
relationship that only a closed-end fund can guarantee. The interpretation is that
VCs benefit from committing to a size in the first place.
In Chapter 3, the focus moves to the study of the distortions in fund managers’
behavior that may occur within a fund’s life. A setting is introduced where infor-
mation about a manager’s ability is imperfect and managers are interested in their
reputation. Given the application to investments in young firms, managers in the
model are agents that create value because they can experiment and learn about a
projects potential. Their incentive to take on risk is distorted by career concerns, and
can result in under or over risk-taking. The result contrasts with Holmstrom (1999)
where managers directly affect the project’s success rate, and career concerns can only
produce inefficiently low risk-taking. It is shown that the inefficiency is reduced when
the market can also observe the outcome of projects with the same fundamental.
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Chapter 1 - A Theory of Venture Capital Fund Size
with Directed Search∗
Abstract
I develop a theory of fund size and structure in venture capital where fund
managers - the VCs - add value to the projects they finance, but their human
capital is scarce. I propose a matching model where VCs span their nurturing
activity over more projects, and entrepreneurs, who own the projects, direct
their search to VCs based on their projects’ quality. VCs differ in the ability
to scale up their human capital. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for positive and negative assortative matching over VC attention and project
quality to emerge. Anticipating positive sorting, VCs shrink fund size below
the efficient level. Entry of unskilled VCs feeds back into equilibrium sorting,
increases returns at the top of the distribution - consistently with empirical
evidence - and always results in a Pareto-improvement. This offers a new angle
to think about policies encouraging entry in the venture capital industry.
1 Introduction
Venture capital has been undoubtedly a successful model of financing entrepreneur-
ship. The common view among practitioners and academics is that venture capitalists
(henceforth VCs) add value to the companies they finance, on top of the capital they
provide them with.1 There is evidence that VCs differ considerably in their ability to
∗I am indebted to Francesco Nava and Balázs Szentes for their continuous guidance, support and
for many stimulating discussions. This paper has greatly benefited from comments and suggestions
by Daniel Ferreira. I warmly thank Peter Kondor, as well as Ulf Axelson, Michel Azulai, Matteo
Benetton, Gianpaolo Caramellino, Amil Dasgupta, Alexia Delfino, Andrew Ellis, Juanita Gonzalez-
Uribe, Wouter den Haan, Gilat Levy, Marco Pagnozzi, Nicola Persico, Ronny Razin, Antonio Rosato,
Emanuele Tarantino and participants at the LSE Theory Work in Progress Seminars, LSE Finance
PhD Seminar, the SAEe Meeting 2017, and the Petralia Applied Economics Workshop 2016 for
useful comments at various stages. All errors are my own.
1For example they do so through a number of activities such as monitoring, selecting top man-
agement, and experimenting innovative business strategies.
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generate returns and to help their companies get to the initial public offering stage.2
The funds VCs raise often go oversubscribed, and recent evidence suggests they stay
below the point where significant decreasing returns kick in.3 In light of the role they
play in boosting growth, it is important to understand how capital is allocated across,
and used by, these scarce, and differently skilled VCs. Is there an efficient amount of
capital put at the work in this industry?
This paper builds on the observation that in venture capital, those companies
receiving financing are in turn interested in matching with the best VCs. I will argue
that self-selection of different entrepreneurs seeking VC finance into different VC funds
is responsible for an inefficient choice of fund size by VCs, and can explain some of
the regularities we obseve in this industry.
The success of the venture capital model has motivated many governments to try
and stimulate the provision of VC financing in various ways. This has generated a
debate, and some scepticism among academics, on the role of the public sector in
improving private VC activity. In a thorough analysis of the subject, Lerner (2009)
argues that public measures encouraging VC investments may favour only the less
efficient VCs, and even crowd out investments from the most knowledgeable ones.4
But does allowing less sophisticated VCs in the economy necessarily result in bad
outcomes?
I tackle these issues by developing a matching model of fund management in
venture capital. There are two sets of agents in the economy: VCs, and entrepreneurs.
To capture scarcity in the quality and quantity of a VC’s human capital and expertise,
I assume that VCs value added - or attention - to each investment dilutes as the
number of projects they finance increases.5 VCs differ in skill, which governs how
efficient they are at increasing the size of their portfolio: the combination of VC
skill and size ultimately determines the level of attention the VC can provide to each
project under their management; more skilled VCs are those that can provide higher
attention for any given portfolio size. For them, the diseconomies of scale are less
severe. On the other side of the market, each entrepreneur owns one project. Projects
are heterogeneous in quality. A projects needs the input of a VC to become profitable.
2The heterogeneity in skills among VCs has been documented for example by Sørensen (2007)
and Korteweg and Sorensen (2017). For a survey of research in private equity, see Da Rin et al.
(2011). Relevant empirical findings that motivate my modelling assumptions are in Kaplan and
Schoar (2005), Harris et al. (2014) and Robinson and Sensoy (2016). In particular, it appears that 1)
in the cross section, there is a positive size-(net-of-fees) returns relationship at the fund level and 2)
accounting for fund managers fixed effects, average returns to investors are decreasing in fund size.
3See Rossi (2017).
4See in particular the discussion of the Canadian Labor Fund Program in Chapter 6.
5This is arguably one of the most significant drivers of the diseconomies of scale observed in the
industry. For direct evidence of this, see for example Cumming and Dai (2011).
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The return from a project is a deterministic function of its own quality and of the
VC’s attention.
In the model VCs move first and choose a fund size - or capacity - to which
they commit. Entrepreneurs move after VCs. They first decide whether to enter the
market and, if they do so, they observe their projects’ quality; finally, they search for
a suitable VC. Once a match is formed, returns are produced and shared exogenously
between the VC and the entrepreneur. The focus on directed search is motivated
by the application: one major distinction between the activity of VCs compared to
that of other fund managers (e.g. buyouts, mutual funds) is that the former invest in
targets that are in turn interested in their ability to add value; after all, entrepreneurs
remain owners of a significant fraction of the firm they grow with the VC. The idea
that entrepreneurs seeking venture capital money discriminate among VCs based on
their reputation and perceived quality is supported by compelling evidence.6
Once entrepreneurs have directed their search, as many entrepreneurs as vacancies
available are matched at random in a given VC skill-size combination, which defines a
submarket. Since the measure of VCs in the economy, and the capacity they commit
to, are limited, entrepreneurs in a given submarket may get rationed. Hence, when
choosing which VC to search for, entrepreneurs trade off matching with VCs that can
devote more attention to their projects, against the lower search frictions in markets
where VCs attention is lower. Complementarity between the two inputs of the returns
function mean that for the best entrepreneurs, the first force - the value attached to
higher attention - is relatively more salient. This generates positive sorting between
VCs’ attention and entrepreneurial quality.
In turn, this has effects at the initial stage of the game, since VCs anticipate that
managing a fund of larger size attracts low quality entrepreneurs. In equilibrium,
some unskilled VCs shrink the size of their funds below what the welfare maximizing
solution prescribes. The inefficiency arises because VCs don’t internalize the effect
their choice induces on the equilibrium assignment: what drives the separation among
entrepreneurs is the increase in search frictions in markets where attention is higher
compared to where it is lower. But if too many VCs offer high attention, this increase
is too small, and entrepreneurs’ separation is suboptimal. That is, some entrepreneurs
whose quality is relatively low search for high-attention funds, lowering average quality
in those submarkets. In addition, multiple equilibria may generally emerge, with
Pareto-dominated equilibria being those characterized by smaller funds size.
In this environment, subsidizing entry of low skilled VCs that are inactive - for
6Hsu (2004) finds that entrepreneurs are willing to accept worse terms in order to affiliate with
VCs that can provide greater value added. Recent empirical studies, starting from the seminal
contribution by Sørensen (2007), show that there exist positive sorting in the industry between
better VCs and start-up firms with greater potential.
5
example because their ability to generate returns is not sufficient to cover the fixed
costs of starting operations - always results in net aggregate gains. The reason is that
these agents will absorb low quality entrepreneurs; those efficient VCs who choose
to provide higher attention will attract even better projects, because only the worse
entrepreneurs they were originally matched to will find it worthwhile to switch in
the now larger market associated to low attention. In some cases, the total measure
of projects funded by incumbent VCs will also increase. This offers a new angle to
think about public intervention in this market, and a more optimistic point of view
on policies that encourage fundraising devoted to venture investments. Interestingly,
Brander et al. (2014) find evidence that the presence of government-sponsored VCs
does not crowd out, but rather increases investments from private VCs at the aggre-
gate level.7
The model provides novel implications from entry of new VCs on the whole returns
distribution. Specifically, when more unskilled VCs enter the market, while a larger
share of funded projects end up in the lower side of the returns distribution, those
at the top deliver higher returns. This is consistent with the findings in Nanda and
Rhodes-Kropf (2013), who document that investment made “hot” periods are more
likely to fail and give higher returns conditional on not failing, and in Kaplan and
Schoar (2005), who find that, in times characterized by more intense activity in the
industry, capital flows disproportionately to worse performing funds.
A benchmark model with random matching, or with homogeneous entrepreneurs
would not produce the inefficiency in equilibrium fund size, nor the beneficial effect
of entry of new VCs and its effect on the shape of the returns distribution described
above.
Relation to the Literature. The paper directly contributes to the literature fo-
cusing on size determination in fund management, with particular application to the
venture capital asset class. One natural reference is Berk and Green (2004), who
derive several predictions concerning fund flows in the mutual fund industry; like in
that paper, fund managers in my model possess scarce skills, and therefore receive
all the rents from investors by choosing fund size and fees appropriately. However,
while in Berk and Green (2004) this results in an efficient allocation of money across
managers, adding entrepreneurs self selection in my model produces: 1) a generically
inefficient outcome, 2) multiple equilibria that are not welfare equivalent and 3) a
feedback effect of entry of unskilled managers on returns at the top of the distribu-
tion. Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009) model the optimal investment strategy of a VC who
7An empirical assesment of the effects of subsidized funds activity on the profitability of invest-
ments made by incumbent, non-subsidized VCs is still missing in the literature.
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trades off the higher value added from a small portfolio, with the diversification gains
from a large one. Inderst et al. (2006) hold portfolio size constant, and model the
beneficial effect - through stronger competition among entrepreneurs - of having lim-
ited capital at the refinancing stage. I share with the first paper the view that VC’s
human capital dilutes with a larger portfolio, and with the second the idea that the
amount of capital a VC raises affects the type of projects funded. But in my model
the distribution of VCs size and structure affects the sorting; I study the equilibria
that result from the interaction among VCs that anticipate this effect.
In terms of the entrepreneur-VC relationship, in my economy matches form be-
tween two parties whose payoffs are asymmetrically affected by the current match:
while the entrepreneur is solely interested in the return from his project, the VC cares
about the total fund’s returns. The VC faces a typical quality-quantity of matches
trade-off. This approach to modelling the venture capital environment, and the es-
sential tension implicit to it, is shared with several recent works. In Michelacci and
Suarez (2004), the focus is on identifying institutional market characteristics that
increase total welfare by alleviating this trade-off and allowing VCs to free up their
human capital quicker, without destroying too much of the monitored firm’s value;
Jovanovic and Szentes (2013) find conditions under which the optimal contractual
arrangement in presence of moral hazard on the entrepreneurs’ side takes the form
of an equity contract. They also explain the returns premium to VC-backed firms;
Silveira and Wright (2015) study project selection on the VC’s side and optimal fund
size when start-up costs are random but committing funds entails opportunity costs.
Contrary to mine, none of the aforementioned models analyse sorting of different en-
trepreneurs with different VCs in presence of these forces. More importantly, while I
also assume diseconomies of scale, I don’t restrict intermediaries to run one project
at a time. This more realistic assumption allows to study 1) the equilibrium choice of
span of control and 2) the choice of how frequently go back to the market and actively
search for new investments, possibly before the current one has produced returns. The
VC-entrepreneur relationship has been also the subject of a large strand of literature
focusing on the inherent agency problems associated to venture capital financing, and
the contractual arrangements aimed at solving this problems: notable examples are
Cornelli and Yosha (2003) and Repullo and Suarez (2004), both analysing optimal
security design when new information is produced about the investment at an inter-
mediate stage, which is an essential characteristic of this environment; in Schmidt
(2003) the double moral hazard problem between the two parties justifies the use
of convertible preferred equity, while Hellmann (2006) extends this analysis to al-
low for a distinction between exit via IPO and via private acquisition and finds that
automatic conversion is only triggered under exit via IPO in the optimal contract; fi-
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nally, Casamatta (2003) studies the endogenous emergence of external financing from
venture capitalist who also provide human capital, and shows that the optimality
of common stocks versus preferred equity depends on the relative amount invested
by the venture capitalist. I abstract from these issues and take a reduced form ap-
proach to the determination of returns to a project, and assume an exogenous equity
contract between the two parties. However, project’s quality in my model could be
interpreted as a (negative) measure of the severity of the moral hazard problem on
the entrepreneur’s side, naturally affecting total surplus from a match.
Like this paper, Marquez et al. (2014) builds upon the fundamental observation
that investments in venture capital are special in that they are subject to a two-sided
matching problem. Marquez et al. (2014) develop a signal-jamming model where VCs
with differential ability to produce returns distort the fund size decision in order to
affect entrepreneurs’ learning; this, coupled with rigidity in fees adjustment ex-post,
prevents them from extracting the full surplus from investors. In my model instead,
the VCs ability is common knowledge. Moreover, while Marquez et al. (2014) take a
reduced form approach to the determination of a fund’s portfolio quality, I study and
characterize sorting explicitly; since relative gains from committing higher attention
are endogenous, I can derive conditions under which an equilibrium where every VC
chooses a certain fund structure might unravel; plus, modelling sorting allows me to
study efficiency of the funds allocation across VCs, and study the effects of entry of
VCs on the entire allocation and returns distribution.
On a more abstract level, my paper provides conditions for sorting in a match-
ing environment with non-transferable utilities and search frictions. Eeckhout and
Kircher (2010) derive general results on the consequences of search frictions in an
assignment problem where sellers commit on posted prices. Requirements on the
match-value function for positive and negative sorting are found to depend on the
elasticity of substitution in the matching technology. In my model, where utilities
are non-transferable, the strongest form of supermodularity (and submodularity) is
needed to guarantee sorting, under any specification of the matching function. More
results related to my setting are in Eeckhout and Kircher (2016) who study the inter-
action between the choice of span of control and the sorting pattern in an assignment
economy; they look at competitive equilibria where types are observable on both
sides, and the allocation is not limited to one-to-one. In my model there will be no di-
rect type complementarity, hence what will govern sorting is the interaction between
the diseconomies of scale, the span-of-control complementarity and the managerial
resource complementarity.
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Roadmap: Section 2 introduces the setup, followed by the characterization of the
equilibria; Equilibria are ranked in terms of welfare achieved and compared to a second
best solution in Section 3; Section 4 explores the effects of entry of new VCs in the
economy; Section 5 concludes; All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Agents. The economy consists of heterogeneous venture capitalists (henceforth VCs),
identical investors and ex-ante identical entrepreneurs. There is an arbitrarily large
measure of investors. Each investor is endowed with money, which they can invest
into funds, each managed by a single VC. VCs are exogenously endowed with ability,
denoted x, according to the measure G, that admits a continuous density g with full
support [x, x] ⊂ R+. The measure of VCs in the economy is fixed. Entrepreneurs are
in large supply, and can enter the market upon paying startup cost c. If they do, they
draw a type λ, the quality of the project they own, from a continuous distribution f
strictly positive on the entire support
[
λ, λ
]
⊂ R+. An higher λ is a better project
in a way specified in the next paragraph. Entrepreneurs need money and the VCs’
input to make their projects turn into profitable firms.8
Projects. All projects need only one unit of money to become a firm. Call m the
measure of projects a given VC is matched to in equilibrium. Define a the attention
the VC devotes to each project. Assume a ∈ {a0, a1, ..., aN}, with ai > ai−1. VC’s
attention, or managerial input, is a function of his ability and the number of firms he
is matched to, a := a (m,x). In particular a (m,x) is the step function:
a (m,x) =
aN ∀m ∈ [0, m
x
N ]
ai ∀m ∈
(
mxi+1, m
x
i
]
with mxi − mxi+1 = ∆ > 0 for all x and i, and ∂mxi /∂x > 0 for all i and all x.
In words, the two conditions mean that 1) VCs’ input gets diluted when working
on more projects in parallel, 2) better managers can run more projects at a given
level of attention. A manager with ability x can be matched to a maximum of mx0
8A natural interpretation - which fits the common view of the role of venture capitalists - is that
young firms need to be constantly monitored, be it because entrepreneurs are unexperienced, or
because the lack of collaterals makes it impossible to find alternative sources of financing.
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projects.9,10 Each project’s return, R, is assumed to be a function of attention, a, and
of the project’s quality, λ. Call this function R (a, λ).11 It is natural to have Ra (a, λ)
and Rλ (a, λ) > 0. I further assume that R (a, λ) is twice continuously differentiable
in its arguments.
Matching and Information. While VCs’ size and ability are common knowledge,
the entrepreneur’s type, λ, is his private information. Therefore, I study directed
search from the long and informed side of the market, the entrepreneurs. Each VC’s
combination of size and ability, (w, x), will therefore form a submarket where en-
trepreneurs will select into, possibly depending on their type. Finally, assume that
as many matches as possible are formed in each submarket; that is, the number of
matches as a function of the measure of entrepreneurs searching, qe, and the measure
of money available (or “vacancies”), qk, is given by M (qk, qe) = min {qk, qe}.
Payoffs, Strategies and Timing. In the first stage of the game, each VCs offers
investors a contract (w, p) , which specifies the size of the fund, w, and fixed fee
p that the VC receives from the investors for every dollar invested.12As all projects
require one unit of money, I will refer to fund size w as the fund’s capacity, that is
the maximum measure of entrepreneurs the VC can be matched to. Investors can
accept the contract, and provide the VC with w dollars, or reject and invest in an
alternative technology delivering constant returns R0. When investing in a certain
VC, they will get a fixed share α ∈ (0, 1) of the VC’s average returns from the fund.
In the second stage, entrepreneurs observe the joint distribution of (w, x) induced by
the first stage, and choose whether or not to pay the startup cost. Those who do, can
direct their search towards different VCs. Conditional on being matched, they receive
the residual - (1− α) - share of the returns from their projects. All agents are risk
neutral and maximize expected returns.
9The assumption that attention jumps discontinuously with m is of no consequence in terms of
the qualitative results, but allows to guarantee existence of equilibria when size is the VC’s choice.
10Amore general setting could allow for ∆ to be a function of x . In which case, to ensure separation
of VCs in equilibrium, I would need to impose the single crossing condition ∂
(
mx0
mx0−∆(x)
)
/∂x < 0,
which is satisfied when ∆ is constant across xs.
11The direct implication is that a is all that matters to a given type of entrepreneur. In other
words, project’s quality does not interact with VC’s ability or fund size per se. This separability will
greatly simplify the analysis.
12As it will be clear when studying size determination, the assumption that VCs receive no
performance-based compensation is without loss of generality. This is due to: 1) the fact that
there is no agency conflict between investors and VCs, nor uncertainty about the VC’s ability, and
2) the presence of a large measure of investors, which implies that investors’ participation constraint
will bind in all equilibria.
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2.1 The Entry and Sorting Subgames
Market Tightness. Let me first study the subgame where entrepreneurs make the
entry decision and direct their search into different VCs. Assume that the allocation
of investors’ money generates fund size between w and w with w > w. Denote
H (w, x) the measure of venture capitalists with fund size below w and ability below
x.13 Upon entry, the search strategy for an entrepreneur is described by a distribution
over [w,w]× [x, x]. Formally, the entrepreneur strategy is a mapping
s :
[
λ, λ
]
→4 ([w,w]× [x, x]) .
The strategy generates for every λ a cumulative density function S (w, x;λ). Calling
E the measure of entrepreneurs who decide to enter. Define S˜ (w, x,E) the measure of
entrepreneurs searching in market with size below w and ability below x, given E. This
is given by summing the search strategy over all the entrepreneurs, so S˜ (w, x;E) =´
λ
ES (w, x;λ) dF (λ). On the other side of the market, as a VC managing fund of
size w can follow up to w projects in parallel, the amount of vacancies in submarkets
below (w, x) is given by
´ x
−∞
´ w
−∞ wˆdH (wˆ, xˆ). To define expected payoffs properly, let
θ (w, x;E) be the expected ratio of vacancies to entrepreneurs in submarket (w, x),
when a measure of E entrepreneurs has entered. I will refer to θ (w, x;E) as market
tightness. The function will solve:
ˆ x
−∞
ˆ w
−∞
wˆdH (wˆ, xˆ) =
ˆ x
−∞
ˆ w
−∞
θ (wˆ, xˆ;E) dS˜ (wˆ, xˆ;E) .
Finally, define Q (w, x;E) the probability an entrepreneur finds a match when search-
ing in market (w, x). Given that the matching function is Leontief, this is:14
Q (w, x;E) := min {θ (w, x;E) , 1} .
I can now write type-λ entrepreneur’s expected payoff from choosing to search in
market (w, x) as:
(1− α)Q (w, x;E)R (a (m (w, x;E) , x) , λ)
13This is endogenous, as it is determined by the investors and VCs equilibrium choice. Hence no
assumption on H is made at this stage.
14The assumption that the matching function is Leontief does not affect the equilibrium char-
acterization. However, it is relevant in the welfare analysis. By assuming that as many matches
as possible are formed in every submarket, I can abstract from inefficiencies that might arise from
matching frictions within the submarket, and focus on those coming from the directed search as-
sumption alone.
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where m (w, x;E) is the measure of projects per VC in market (w, x). Note that
m (w, x;E) ≤ w, but the condition may, in principle, not bind. To save on notation, I
will denote piλ (E, s∗) the equilibrium value of type-λ entrepreneur’s expected payoff.
I can now describe what is an equilibrium of this subgame.
Definition 1. (Equilibrium in the Subgame). An equilibrium in the entry and
sorting subgame is characterized by a vector (E, s∗) such that:
(i) s∗ (λ) = arg maxs Ew,x [Q (w, x;E, s∗) (1− α)R (a (m (w, x;E, s∗) , x) , λ)]
(ii)
´
λ
piλ (E, s∗) dF (λ) = c
Part (i) imposes optimality. Part (ii) from the unlimited number of entrepreneurs:
it states that, ex-ante, entrepreneurs must be indifferent between entering the market
and staying out.
An immediate observation to make is that in this model, not only the entrepreneur’s
search strategy imposes an externality to each other entrepreneur through its usual
effect on search frictions, it also does by affecting VCs attention. In principle, this
can generate a multitude of equilibria where the value of a VC is ultimately deter-
mined by the measure of entrepreneurs searching in a given submarket. However, one
additional assumption can be shown to substantially simplify the sorting game. The
assumption requires that lower VC’s attention is not too detrimental to the average
type, as formalized below.
Assumption A1. (1− α)EλR (a0, λ) > c ∀λ.
A1 states that, ex-ante, an entrepreneur would strictly benefit from paying the
startup cost and match to a VC in absence of search frictions, even when the VC’s
attention is fully diluted (at its lowest level it is given by a0). When A1 holds, because
entrepreneurs are in large supply, new ones will enter the market until search frictions
kick in. This also implies that a situation where some VCs attract no entrepreneur
can not be an equilibrium of the subgame, since those VCs would be able to provide
the highest attention at no search friction, offering a strict incentive to deviate to
entrepreneurs.
Lemma 1. Under A1, in any equilibrium, in each submarket there are more en-
trepreneurs than vacancies. That is, Q (w, x,E) < 1 and m (w, x,E) = w, ∀(w, x)
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The implication of Lemma 1 is that all VCs operate at full capacity. The next
result is a direct consequence of Lemma 1, and will help characterize the equilibrium
strategies in the sorting subgame.
Lemma 2. Given E, in any equilibrium, Q (w, x;E) is a function of a (w, x) only.
Intuitively, because VCs must operate at full capacity in every equilibrium, atten-
tion in market (w, x) is given by a (w, x). As returns are only a function of attention
and project’s quality, an entrepreneur must be indifferent between searching in two
markets where attention is the same. This suggests that, in essence, the entrepreneur’s
strategy reduces to which attention levels a to seek matching with.
Lemma 3. For a given E, any equilibrium of the sorting subgame is mirrored by one
from a game where entrepreneurs can only direct their search to different attention
levels, and are then matched with VCs that are at the chosen attention, in proportion
to each VC’s size.
In words, because entrepreneurs must be indifferent between searching in any
market where attention is the same, any equilibrium can equivalently be represented
by one where their strategy is to simply choose to search over different levels of
attention, which in this reduced model is a fixed, predetermined characteristic of the
VC. The distribution of vacancies will reflect total size summed across all VCs at a
given iso-attention locus in the original model.
Lemma 3 turns useful because it allows to focus on a particular type of sorting
equilibrium, where the sole characteristic of a VC, hence what defines a sub-market
to search in, is attention. The interest is then to study what requirements should the
return function obey to, so that in a general setting, independently of the distribution
of types, sorting would emerge. If such conditions are identified, one can conclude that
the same sorting pattern would emerge in the original model, once mixed strategies
are adjusted accordingly.
Let Λs (a) be the set of entrepreneurs applying to market a under strategy s,
Λs (a) := {λ : s (a;λ) > 0}.
Definition 2. An equilbrium exhibits positive (negative) assortative matching if ∀a, a′
with a > a′
λ ∈ Λs (a) ∩ λ′ ∈ Λs
(
a
′)⇒ λ > (<)λ′.
Intuitively, under positive assortative matching (henceforth PAM), higher attention
can not be associated with a worse entrepreneur; however, pooling of more en-
trepreneurs into a given attention level is allowed. I can now state the main result
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of this section, that estabilishes necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to
exhibit PAM or NAM.
Proposition 1. (Sorting). All equilibria exhibit PAM (NAM) if and only if R (a, λ)
is everywhere logsuper(sub)modular.
Notice that logsuper(sub)modularity implies super(sub)modularity, while the opposite
does not hold. To build intuition why a stronger form of supermodularity is necessary
for PAM, notice that, as emphasized by Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), when allowing
for search frictions in matching models, two forces drive the sorting pattern, in oppo-
site directions: the “trading security motive”, which motivates higher types to select
into less crowded markets, and the “match value motive”, which is related to the value
of being matched to better types. In this setting, the latter motive corresponds to the
value of the VC’s attention, which is a bigger concern when λ is high15. This trade-off
becomes evident if one looks at the difference in expected payoff from searching in
any two markets, a and a′ , with a > a′ , and differentiates it with respect to λ. This
difference is increasing in λ when:
−
(
Q (a)−Q
(
a
′))
Q (a′) Rλ (a, λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
trading security motive
<
∂
(
R (a, λ)−R
(
a
′
, λ
))
∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
match value motive
.
In words, only when complementarities in the returns function between attention and
quality are sufficiently strong does a higher-λ entrepreneur prefer to search for higher
attention and face the larger search frictions in this, more crowded, market.
To understand why the logsupermodularity is sufficient, notice that a function R (a, λ)
is logsupermodular if and only if, for any
(
a, a
′) with a′ > a, the ratioR (a′ , λ) /R (a, λ)
is strictly increasing in λ. This means that, if for some type λ˜, Q
(
a
′)
R
(
a
′
, λ˜
)
>
Q (a)R
(
a, λ˜
)
, the same would be true for all λ > λ˜. This ensures separation.
The rest of the analysis focuses on the case when R (a, λ) is logsupermodular. 16
Assumption A2. R (a, λ) is everywhere logsupermodular.
15It should be noted that the condition in Proposition 1 is particularly strong because utilities
are non-transferable. In the framework proposed by Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), where sellers can
commit on posted prices, it is shown that, although supermodularity per se is generally not sufficient,
the requirements for PAM to emerge are milder. In particular, the degree of supermodularity depends
on the elasticity of substitution in the matching function. Notably here, with directed search and non-
transferable utilities, the result that R must be logsupermodular holds true under any specification
of the matching function.
16Focusing on the case when R leads to assortative matching is motivated by the fact that, as it
will be clear in the next section, this will guarantee all equilibria exhibit positive sorting between
firms and managers, which is consistent with the evidence started by Sørensen (2007). Interestingly,
the idea that better entrepreneurs are those that gain more by receiving VCs’ advise appears to
be at the core of the following quote by Fred Wilson, managing partner at Union Square Ventures:
“When it’s clear the founder only wants your money and has no interest in your advice, it is hard to
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2.2 Choice of Fund Size and Equilibrium in the Supergame
In this section I study the VCs’ choice at the initial stage, when contracting on size
and fees with investors. Therefore, I endogenize the distribution H (w, x), and hence
will characterize equilibria of the entire game. I will restrict attention to equilibria
where both VCs and entrepreneurs play symmetric, pure strategies.
As in Berk and Green (2004), VCs contract with competing investors over the
fund’s size and a per-dollar fee. Notice that, for every unit of money invested in the
fund, investors’ participation constraint gives:
αE [R (a (w, x) , λ) |λ ∈ Λs (a (w, x))]− p ≥ R0. (1)
Since VCs have all bargaining power, it must be that the net return to investors
equals their outside option, R0. In other words (1) has to bind. It follows that VCs
will choose w to maximize total excess returns, and then set p in such a way that
investors’ participation constraint binds, so to extract the full surplus and maximize
total fees.
VC Strategy. The VC’s decision can be further simplified by noting that, as en-
trepreneur’s selection is affected by fund size only through its effect on attention, a VC
will never set a size strictly in one region where the function a (m,x) is constant. It fol-
lows that the relevant strategic choice from a VC is which attention ai to offer. The VC
will consequently propose investors the maximum size conditional on ai, that is mxi .
VC’s strategy is therefore fully described by a mapping σ : [x, x] → {a0, a1, ..., aN}.
I will sometimes refer to funds associated with higher attention as to more “focused”
funds, although it should be emphasized that a more focused fund could well be of
larger size than a less focused one, if it is managed by a more efficient VC. Define
the set of VCs types choosing to offer ai given σ, Xσi := {x : σ (x) = ai}. Finally,
define the set of attention levels offered in equilibrium I∗ := {i : Xσi 6= ∅}. At any
ai with i ∈ I∗, and given s, E, and σ, one can then compute the probability for an
entrepreneur to find a match, or, equivalently, market tightness as:
Q (ai;σ, s, E) =
´
x∈Xσi
mxi dG (x)
E
´
λ∈Λs(a) dF (λ)
.
Before I define what is an equilibrium in the entire game, it is necessary to specify how
VCs beliefs about the composition of entrepreneurs in a given market are formed. The
notion of Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilbrium only disciplines beliefs on the equilibrium
get excited about the investment. When it seems that all the founder wants is your advice and isn’t
worried about getting money, it makes you want to work with that founder”.
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path, by restricting these to be computed via Bayes rule.17 Formally, the belief β is
a mapping:
β : {a0, .., aN} → 4
([
λ, λ
])
and, using Bayes rule, we have that, for i ∈ I∗,
βλ (ai) =
f (λ)´
λ∈Λs(a) dF (λ)
where βλ (ai) is the pdf β (ai) evaluated at λ. What about beliefs for markets where
no VC is positioned, that is for any j /∈ I∗? I am going to impose a restriction on these
beliefs. The approach I follow is based on the same argument adopted by Guerrieri
et al. (2010) in a similar setting. Let me first state the restriction, and then explain
the intuition behind it.
Requirement 1. Given a subgame equilibrium (s∗, E) and associated entrepreneurs
expected payoff pi∗λ, the belief βλ (aj) is strictly positive if and only if the set:
Q (λ; aj) := {Q ∈ [0, 1] | Q (1− α)R (aj, λ) ≥ piλ}
is maximal.18 If Q (λ) is empty for all λ, the VC expects no entrepreneur to search
in market aj.
Essentially, for every λ, one can construct the set of Qs such that the entrepreneur
would (weakly) benefit from deviating and search in market aj. A VC that is con-
templating to offer such level of attention must believe that this offer would attract
the type(s) that are willing to face the highest search friction, that is, to deviate at
the lowest level of Q.19
In comparing equilibria, I will sometime need to compute market tightness in empty
markets. To do this, I will use the lowest Q such that the type(s) selected by Require-
ment 1 (weakly) benefits from the deviation. Armed with the definitions above, I
can now formally state what is an equilibrium of the game.
17For a formal definition of Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium see definition 9.C.3 in Mas-Colell
et al. (1995)
18For a given collection of sets Q (λ; aj), λ ∈
[
λ, λ
]
, Q
(
λˆ; aj
)
is said to be maximal if it is not a
subset of any other Q (λ; aj).
19Note that the value of Q (λ; aj) can come from the VCs off-equilibrium behavior, the vacancies
posted at attention aj . Requirement 1 can be then interpreted as follows: “the type that is expected
to search in aj is the one for which there is a larger set of VCs actions that would make this deviation
profitable”. In this sense, Requirement 1 is an adaptation of condition D1 introduced by Cho and
Kreps (1987) for signaling games.
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Definition 3. (Equilibrium). An Equilibrium is a vector (E, s∗, σ∗, β) constituting
a Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, with the restriction that β satisfies Requirement
1 off the equilibrium path.
In what follows, I characterize all equilibria of the game. The main message will
be that better VCs will necessarily match with higher quality entrepreneurs. This
comes directly from the result in the previous section, together with the properties
of the function a (m,x), ensuring that the best VCs have to give up fewer projects in
order to provide higher levels of attention. To save on notation I denote Q∗i the level
of market tightness in market ai in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. (Partitional Equilibria). All equilibria are described by a par-
tition of the set [x, x¯] defined by cutoffs {x = x−1, ..xi, .., xN = x} and a partition of[
λ, λ
]
defined by cutoffs
{
λ = λ−1, ..λi, .., λN = λ
}
such that for any i ∈ I∗, Λs∗i =
[λi−1, λi] and Xσ
∗
i = [xi−1, xi] . If i /∈ I∗,λi = λi−1 and xi = xi−1. For all adjacent
i, j ∈ I∗ with i > j:
(i) mxjj
(
αE
[
R (aj , λ) | λ ∈ Λs∗j
]
− R0
)
= mxji
(
αE
[
R (ai , λ) | λ ∈ Λs∗i
]
− R0
)
.
(ii) Q∗j (1− α)R (aj, λj) = Q∗i (1− α)R (ai, λj) .
(iii) For any j /∈ I∗,
mxii
(
αE
[
R (ai , λi) |λ ∈ Λs∗i
]
−R0
)
≥ mxij (αR (aj , λj)− R0) ∀i ∈ I∗.
In words the proposition states that all equilibria have the following form: en-
trepreneurs and VCs select into different attention levels according to their type, with
successive subintervals of the equilibrium partitions Λs∗i and Xσ
∗
i corresponding to set
of VCs and entrepreneurs selecting higher attention. Conditions (i) and (ii) impose
that type at the limit of each subinterval are indifferent between the two adjacent
attention levels where types right below and above are assigned to. Condition (iii)
is where the requirement on off-equilibrium beliefs kicks in. Notice that, if j /∈ I∗,
λj = λj−1. Hence, condition (iii) is requiring that no VC finds it profitable to de-
viate to an off equilibrium aj, given that this deviation would attract the highest
entrepreneur in the set of those who select the closest lower ai among those i ∈ I∗.
Notice that this also implies that, when offering some out-of-equilibrium attention
higher than in any non-empty market, a VC must expect to attract (if any) only type
λ, the type most willing to switch to that market. Similarly, offering attention lower
than in any non-empty market can only attract the lowest type, λ. Figure 1 provides
a graphical representation of an equilibrium.
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Figure 1: In this example, there are four non-empty submarkets in equilibrium. By offering
attention a2 - that no VC chooses in this example - a VC must believe to attract type λ1, being the
highest type searching in a1 in equilibrium.
3 Efficiency
Ex-ante, total welfare in the economy amounts to the expected fees VCs receive from
the investors. This is due to investors perfectly competing for VCs, and the en-
trepreneurs’ free entry condition. In expectation, VCs are the only agents extracting
rents. Denote W ∗i total vacancies in a given market i, in a given equilibrium. W ∗i
depends on the particular equilibrium strategy profile that is examined. Since the fees
VCs get equal the total excess returns to investors, for a given equilibrium, aggregate
welfare is then given by:
V (E, s∗, σ∗) =
∑
i∈{1,..,N}
W ∗i
(
αE
[
R (ai , λ) |λ ∈ Λσ∗i
]
−R0
)
.
Generally, equilibria need not be unique. A first question one can ask is whether
some equilibria are more desirable then others, from an ex-ante point of view. The
next proposition states that some type of equilibria can be unambiguously ranked.
Interestingly, the undesirable equilibria are those where markets for higher level of
attention are thicker, relatively to those for lower attention.
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Proposition 3. (Ranking Equilibria).
(i) An equilibrium of the game induces higher welfare than any another equilibrium
where markets for higher attention are thicker, that is Q∗i /Q∗j is bigger for all (i, j)
and i > j.
(ii) An equilibrium of the game induces higher welfare than any another equilibrium
where the ratio W ∗i /W ∗j is bigger for all (i, j) and i > j.
The reason why equilibria where markets for higher level of attention are thicker
are Pareto inferior is that, when increases in search frictions for any two adjacent
markets are small, the resulting assignment is characterized by worse selection at the
top, that is, each cutoff λi is lower, leading to lower average quality at each attention
level. The second part of the Proposition is a consequence of this, and the fact that,
whenever Wi/Wj is larger, entrepreneurs’ search behavior adjusts so that the relative
search friction between market i and j , Qi/Qj, is also larger. The emergence of Pareto
dominated equilibria is due to a typical coordination failure on the VCs side: when
many choose to raise more focused funds, it is relatively easy for entrepreneurs to find
a match in the associated markets; as a result, only very low quality entrepreneurs
are willing to give up the higher attention, and go for a less crowded market. In these
equilibria, this exacerbates the adverse selection associated to setting a larger fund
capacity, and the economy is stuck in a situation where (relatively) inefficient VCs
choose to raise a focused fund.
I now study what would be the welfare maximizing allocation of VCs into fund
sizes when the induced aggregate effect on sorting is taken into account. Below I
define a Second Best Allocation as a solution to this problem. Because for a given
profile of VCs strategies the sorting equilibrium need not be unique, call Λs∗ (σ) the
collection of equilibrium partitions of the set
[
λ, λ
]
associated to a strategy profile σ.
Call Λs∗ (σ;n) one element of this set. By Proposition 2, Λs∗ (σ;n) is composed of
successive intervals, each associated to a submarket ai, and denoted Λs
∗
i (σ;n).
Definition 4. A Second Best Allocation is a mapping σ˜ : [x, x]→ {a0, a1, ..., aN}
that solves:
σ˜ = arg maxσ
∑
i∈{1,..,N} W σi (αE [R (ai , λ) |λ ∈ Λi ]−R0)
s.t. ∀i, Λi = Λs∗i (σ;n) for some n
It is easy to observe that a Second Best allocation must be characterized by a
partition of [x, x], with more skilled VCs being assigned to higher levels of attention.
Call xsbi the limits of this partition. The next result compares the equilibrium with
the second best, in an environment when attention can only be high are low.
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Proposition 4. (Inefficiently small funds). When a ∈ {a0, a1}, xsb0 > x0: in
equilibrium, too many VCs choose high attention compared to the second-best solution.
There is a simple intuition behind this result. A solution to the Second Best
problem involves a tradeoff between allocating VCs to their optimal size, and the
motive to increase relative search frictions so to induce a higher cutoff, and hence
higher average quality in both markets; however, starting from any equilibrium -
including the Pareto superior one - a marginal increase in x0 come at a negligible
(close to zero) cost in terms of the misallocation of VCs to a larger fund size, but has
a strictly positive impact on the sorting outcome through the increase in λ0.
4 Entry and Comparative Statics
In this section I conduct comparative statics around a refined set of equilibria. In
particular, I will derive two sets of results: first, I will look at the effects of equilibrium
sorting and welfare when an inflow of new VCs enter the market; second, I will compare
economies that differ in how strong is entrepreneurs’ self-selection, and derive results
on average fund size.
Stable Equilibria. Let me restrict the analysis of this section to the case where
attention can be either high or low, so that VCs and entrepreneurs can sort into two
submarkets only. That is, a ∈ {a0, a1}. The main advantage is that, for a given
equilibrium cutoff x0, the induced equilibrium sorting is unique. This facilitates the
comparative statics around a candidate equilibrium. First, it is convenient to define
the function
φ
(
a, a
′
, λ˜
)
:=
αE
[
R (a, λ) |λ ≥ λ˜
]
−R0
αE
[
R (a′ , λ) |λ ≤ λ˜
]
−R0
.
The function φ
(
a, a
′
, λ˜
)
is the expected per dollar excess return from choosing atten-
tion, a, and attract entrepreneurs above some λ˜, relative to the excess return from
choosing attention a′ and attract entrepreneurs below the same threshold. The func-
tion φ
(
a, a
′
, λ˜
)
need not be monotone in λ˜. Below is an example where it is always
decreasing.
Example 1. Assume quality λ is uniformly distributed over the support [0, 1]. Re-
turns are given by R (a, λ) = a + (a− k) ρ (λ) with a > k > 0.20 If ρ (.) is any
increasing linear function, it can be verified that the ratio φ
(
a, a
′
, λ˜
)
is decreasing in
λ˜ for any a > a′ and any k, R0 > 0.
20This function is logsupermodular whenever ρ′ > 0.
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Unless the function is increasing everywhere, equilibria may not be unique. I introduce
below one appealing property of a candidate equilibrium, that will help identify the
comparative statics of this section. The property is based on a stability argument and
will refine the set of equilibria. Notice that the equations identifying the equilibrium
vector (x0, λ0) are
mx01 (αE [R (a1, λ) | λ ≥ λ0]− R0)−mx00 (αE [R (a0, λ) | λ ≤ λ0]−R0) = 0 (2)
and
W1 (x0)
1− F (λ0) (1− α)R (a1, λ0)−
W0 (x0)
F (λ0)
(1− α)R (a0, λ0) = 0. (3)
Call η (x0, λ0) the left hand side of (2) and µ (λ0, x0) the left hand side of (3).
Definition 5. (Stable Equilibria). An Equilibrium
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
is stable if it is an
attracting fixed point of the vector function:
Θ (x0, λ0) =
 η (x0, λ0) + x0
µ (λ0, x0) + λ0

In words, a stable equilibrium is one that, after a small perturbation that forces
some agents’ strategies away from it, will eventually converge back to itself.21
21In the Appendix, it is shown that this is equivalent to requiring stability of the costant solution
(x0, λ0) to a system of differential equations where x0 is assumed to increase (decrease) proportially
to the marginal benefit (loss) to type x0 from chossing attention a0 rather than a1, given λ0, and
the same is assumed for the differential equation governing the changes of λ0 for a given x0.
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Figure 2: Left: The solid line is the solution to the entrepreneur’s indifference condition for each
level of x0. Arrows above (below) this line point upwards (downwards) because if the population
cutoff was type λ, he would strictly benefit (lose) from moving to market a0. The dotted line connects
all the indifferent VCs, for each λ0. Arrows at the west (east) of the line point to the right (left)
because if the population cutoff was type x, he would strictly benefit (lose) from moving to market
a0. The stable equilibria are the two intersection at the bottom-left and top-right of the picture.
Right: The solid line is the function mx00 /m
x0
1 , decreasing because the relative difference between
m0 and m1 is smaller for better VCs. The dotted line is φ (a1, a0, λ0 (x0)) which moves with x0
through its effect on λ0 and is decreasing because when x0 increases, λ0 increases, and φλ˜ < 0 by
assumption. An equilibrium is an intersection of this two curves, and stable equilibria (denoted I
and II) are those where φ is flatter than mx00 /m
x0
1 at the intersection. In this example, there are
three equilibria. I is the worse equilibrium, while II is the welfare maximizing equilibrium.
I will now conduct comparative statics around a stable equilibrium.
4.1 Inflow of Unskilled VCs
The analysis so far has focused on an economy where the measure and distribution
of VCs is fixed. As introduced in Section 1, however, one object of interest of my
analysis is to study the effect of entry of new VCs on the equilibrium allocation of
investors money and projects to VCs. This is mainly motivated by the debate around
the effectiveness of policies that encourage VC investments, and by the recent finding
that government sponsored VC has not crowded out investments by private VCs at
the aggregate level. Moreover, there exists evidence that money committed in the
venture capital industry is highly volatile, that it is subject to booms and busts and
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that the number of funds dedicated to this asset class vary across time, sometimes
in response to the business cycle. Determining the reason why these cycles occur is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, the model can offer predictions on how
the distribution of returns is affected by the inclusion of new VCs in the economy.
One interesting exercise is to study what happens when new unskilled VCs enter the
market. More precisely, imagine the distribution of skills g is defined on a support
larger than [x, x]. Initially, only VCs in [x, x] operate. What will happen if some of
the worse VCs previously excluded decide to enter? In other words, what are the
consequences of a decrease in x? Notice that the exclusion of some VCs from the
market could be resulting from the presence of barriers to entry. Since VCs expected
payoff in equilibrium is strictly increasing in x, if being active in the market requires
a fixed investment κ, the ex-ante payoff to the marginal VC - x - would be given, in
an interior equilibrium, by:
m
x
0α (E [R (a0, λ) | λ ≤ λ0]−R0) = κ.
In this environment, subsidizing the investment κ to the highest type outside the
market would be equivalent to induce a marginal decrease in x in the venture capital
market. The result below states what is the induced effect of this change on all stable
equilibria.
Proposition 5. (Entry of unskilled VCs). For every stable equilibrium (x0, λ0):
(i) ∂λ0
∂x
< 0.
(ii) As x decreases, welfare increases.
(iii) ∂x0
∂x
> 0 if and only if φλ˜ (a1, a0, λ0) > 0.
In words, the inflow of unskilled VCs leads some entrepreneurs to switch to the
low attention market: the indifferent entrepreneur’s quality is higher; total welfare
increases; when the function φ
(
a, a
′
, λ˜
)
is decreasing in the cutoff λ˜ - hence the relative
gain in attracting entrepreneurs above versus those below λ˜ is lower the higher is λ˜ -
some VCs originally raising a small fund, opt for a large fund.
The intuition is simple. The relatively unskilled VCs who enter the market will
select a0. The larger number of vacancies in the market for low attention pushes the
cutoff λ0 up. This implies that those VCs who will keep raising relatively smaller funds
will select better projects. Essentially, the now larger market for unfocused funds
absorbs some of the low quality entrepreneurs from the economy. Because the increase
in λ0 increases average quality in both submarkets, total welfare increases. When
the function φ
(
a, a
′
, λ˜
)
is decreasing in λ˜, the adverse selection problem associated
to managing a larger fund is less severe, inducing more VCs to raise one. In this
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circumstance, the inflow of unsophisticated venture capitalists increases average fund
size and aggregate investments in the market. This is consistent with the findings in
Brander et al. (2014).
Think now of the distribution of returns of funded projects in the industry. Returns
will necessarily take values R ∈
[
R (a0, λ) , R
(
a1, λ
)]
. The shape of the returns
distribution will depend on that of the distribution of projects quality - f - and
on the equilibrium choices of VCs and entrepreneurs.
I show that the returns distribution is also affected by entry of new, unskilled VCs.
In absence of sorting, the effect one should expect is mechanic: relatively more VC
funds would now end up delivering low returns. When sorting is taken into account
though, the positive externality induced to those incumbents VCs who keep raising
focused fund results in higher returns at the top of the distribution. The corollary
below formalizes this observation.
Corollary 1. (Entry and returns distribution). For each equilibrium, as x
decreases, there exists a point R˜ in the new distribution of returns, such that ∀R > R˜
returns are higher conditional on being above R and are more likely to be below R˜.
The effect is consistent with the findings in Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013), who
document that investment made in “hot” periods are more likely to fail and give
higher returns conditional on not failing, and in Kaplan and Schoar (2005), who find
that, in times characterized by more intense activity in the industry, capital flows
disproportionately to worse funds.
4.2 Intensity of Selection
Imagine the more realistic scenario where, conditional on setting a certain fund size,
only a share ρ ∈ [0, 1] of vacancies is filled via directed search. The residual share
- 1 − ρ - is filled through random matching. The interpretation is that VCs partly
select entrepreneurs from their own network. In essence, ρ measures how intense is
entrepreneurs’ self selection in the market, and what I have studied in the main model
is the case where ρ equals one. Note that this specification has a convenient property:
the entrepreneurs’ search behavior is not affected by the parameter ρ. This is formally
stated in the next claim.
Claim 1. Given a strategy profile from VCs, and associated W ∗0 and W ∗1 , the indiffer-
ent entrepeneur λ0 is independent on ρ.
The next statement compares equilibrium funds size when the parameter ρ in-
creases. Therefore it can be interpreted as a comparison between two economies that
differ in how much of the fund manager’s deal flow is endogenous and self-selected.
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Proposition 6. For every stable equilibrium (x0, λ0), ∂x0
∂ρ
< 0. Consequently, average
fund size is smaller the larger is ρ .
This result is intuitive. Infact, it is immediate to observe that the ratio:
ρ (αE [R (a1, λ) | λ ≥ λ0]−R0) + (1− ρ) (αER (a1, λ)−R0)
ρ (αE [R (a0, λ) | λ ≤ λ0]−R0) + (1− ρ) (αER (a1, λ)−R0)
is increasing in the share of vacancies filled via directed search. Therefore, as the
relative per dollar returns from offering a small fund compared to a large unfocused
fund increase, more VCs will select the former option.
5 Conclusion
I have introduced a matching model of fund management where the two key ingre-
dients are scarcity in fund managers human capital and directed search from en-
trepreneurs who are heterogeneous in their projects’ quality. The two features are
inspired by several stylized facts and empirical findings about the venture capital in-
dustry. In the model, entrepreneurs trade off matching with better VCs - those who
opt for relatively smaller funds, and hence can devote more attention to their projects
- against the lower search frictions associated to worse VCs. VCs are different in
ability to scale up their human capital, and select fund size to maximise total returns.
Anticipating that, due to complementarities in the returns function, higher quality
entrepreneurs will sort into funds where attention is higher, VCs tend to shrink fund
size excessively. In this environment, subsidizing entry of VCs that are inactive - for
example because their ability to generate returns is not sufficient to cover the fixed
costs of starting operations - always results in net aggregate gains. The reason is that
these agents will absorb low quality entrepreneurs, and hence alleviate the adverse
selection problem incumbent VCs are facing. This offers a more optimistic point of
view on policies that encourage fundraising devoted to venture investments. Since
the distribution of fund sizes feeds back into the equilibrium sorting, entry of VCs at
the bottom of the skills distribution increases returns at the top. The effects of entry,
as well as the inefficiency and the emergence of multiple, Pareto-dominated equilibria
are a consequence of entrepreneurs self-selection and would not result from a model
with random matching or homogenous entrepreneurs.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider first those (w, x) for which S˜ (w, x;E) > 0. Take one
submarket (w˜, x˜) where Q (w˜, x˜) = 1. By entering and searching in it, an entrepreneur
that is outside the market gets in expectation:
(1− α)E (a (m (x˜, w˜, E) , x˜) , λ)− c ≥ (1− α)ER (a0, λ)− c > 0.
Hence, when S˜ (w, x;E) > 0, it must be that Q (w˜, x˜) < 1. To show that S˜ (w, x;E) >
0 for all (w, x), assume not and denote (wˆ, xˆ) the submarket where no entrepreneur
searches. Then, any type λ who entered the market would like to deviate and search
in (wˆ, xˆ), as this would give:
(1− α)R (aN , λ) > Q (w, x;E) (1− α)R (a (m (w, x) , x) , λ) ∀ (w, x) .

Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, returns to type λ in market (w, x) conditional
on matching are given by R ((a (w, x)) , λ). Take two markets (w, x) and
(
w
′
, x
′),
with associated attention levels a and a′ , with a = a′ . Assume that Q (w, x,E) >
Q
(
w, x
′
, E
)
. Then, any entrepreneur searching in
(
w
′
, x
′) could deviate to (w, x) and
get:
Q (w, x,E)R (a, λ) > Q
(
w
′
, x
′
, E
)
R
(
a
′
, λ
)
.

Proof of Lemma 3. In the original model entrepreneurs maximizeQ (w, x,E)R (a (w, x) , λ),
and, by Lemma 2, Q (w, x,E) = θ (w, x,E). Because R (a (w, x) , λ) is costant across
an iso-attention locus, and since Lemma 2 must apply to the transformed model,
all that remains to show is that market tightness is the same in submarket a as it
is at any point in the iso-attention locus in the original model. That is, formally,
θ (a) = θ (w, x,E) ∀ (w, x) : a (w, x) = a. Call Γ (a) the sum of vacancies across
all VCs at a given iso-attention locus. From the definition of θ (a), one can write
θ (a) = dΓ (a)
dS(a) with
S (a) :=
ˆ
a˜≤a
ˆ
{(w,x):a(w,x)=a˜}
ˆ
λ
EdS (w, x;λ) da˜.
Recall that
Γ (a) :=
ˆ
a˜≤a
ˆ
{(w,x):a(w,x)=a˜}
wdH (w, x) da˜.
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Therefore,
dΓ (a) =
ˆ
{(w,x):a(w,x)=a}
wdH (w, x)
and
dS (a) =
ˆ
λ
ˆ
{(w,x):a(w,x)=a}
EdS (w, x;λ) .
Notice that
dS˜ (w, x,E) θ (w, x,E) = wdH (w, x) .
Integrating on both sides over a given iso-attention locus, and taking θ (w, x,E) out-
side of the integral by Lemma 2, it follows that
θ (w, x,E)
ˆ
{(w,x):a(w,x)=a˜}
dS˜ (w, x,E) =
ˆ
{(w,x):a(w,x)=a˜}
wdH (w, x) .
Therefore,
θ (w, x,E) =
(ˆ
{(w,x):a(w,x)=a}
wdH (w, x) /
ˆ
{(w,x):a(w,x)=a}
dS˜ (w, x,E)
)
= θ (a) .

Proof of Proposition 1. (Sufficiency). Assume R (a, λ) is logsupermodular every-
where. If there is an equilibrium that does not exhibit PAM everywhere, then there
must exist at least two markets ai , aj with ai > aj, and two types λ
′
, λ with λ′ > λ
such that λ ∈ Λi and λ′ ∈ Λj. Optimality of the search strategy requires that type λ
is at least as well off searching in ai rather that in aj and similarly λ
′ (weakly) prefers
aj to ai, that is:
Q (ai)R (ai, λ) ≥ Q (aj)R (aj, λ) (4)
Q (aj)R
(
aj, λ
′) ≥ Q (ai)R (ai, λ′) (5)
The two inequalities imply
R (ai, λ)
R (aj, λ)
≥ R
(
ai, λ
′)
R (aj, λ′)
which contradicts the fact that R (a, λ) is logsupermodular22.
(Necessity). Assume R (a, λ) is not logsupermodular at some point
(
aˆ, λˆ
)
. The
continuity properties of R (a, λ) (see Section 2) imply that there exists a number ε > 0,
22Logsupermodularity of R (a, λ) implies that for any
(
a, a
′
)
with a′ > a, the ratio
R
(
a
′
,λ
)
R(a,λ) is
strictly increasing in λ.
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s.t. the function is not logsupermodular anywhere in [aˆ− ε, aˆ+ ε]×
[
λˆ− ε, λˆ+ ε
]
. I
construct an economy where NAM could be supported, hence a contradiction arises.
Let F be defined on
[
λˆ− ε, λˆ+ ε
]
, and ai ∈ [aˆ− ε, aˆ+ ε], for all i. By construction,
all matches will be in [aˆ− ε, aˆ+ ε] ×
[
λˆ− ε, λˆ+ ε
]
. In order for only PAM sorting
patterns to emerge, a necessary condition is that for at least two
(
λ, λ
′) with λ > λ′ ,
and two
(
a, a
′), with a > a′ ,
Q (a)R (a, λ) ≥ Q
(
a
′)
R
(
a
′
, λ
)
(6)
Q
(
a
′)
R
(
a
′
, λ
′) ≥ Q (a)R (a, λ′) (7)
and, crucially, at least one of the two inequalities is strict23. When either (7) or (8)
or both are satisfied with strict inequality, it holds that
R (a, λ)
R (a′ , λ) >
R
(
a, λ
′)
R (a′ , λ′)
which means R (a, λ) is logsupermodular somewhere in [aˆ− ε, aˆ+ ε]×
[
λˆ− ε, λˆ+ ε
]
, a contradiction. 
Proof Proposition 2. By Proposition 1, sorting in the subgame must exhibit PAM.
Each point in the sequence that forms the equilibrium partition of the set
[
λ, λ¯
]
is a
type that must be indifferent between searching in the two markets where types just
above and just below are assigned.
Consider a VC with ability x that is choosing between ai (and associated size, mxi )
and aj (with associated size mxj ), with i > j and i, j ∈ I∗. This VC will prefer the
first option if and only if:
mxiE
[
R (ai , λ) |λ ∈ Λs∗i
]
> mxj E
[
R (aj , λ) |λ ∈ Λs∗j
]
.
Which can be rewritten as:
mxi
mxj
>
E
[
R (aj , λ) |λ ∈ Λs∗j
]
E [R (ai , λ) |λ ∈ Λs∗i ]
. (8)
The right hand side of (9) is independent on x. The left hand side is continuous and
increasing in x. Therefore, if (9) holds for some x, it will hold for any VC with ability
above x. Moreover, if the same inequality is reverted for some x′ < x, then, by the
23Otherwise, it would be possible to support an equilibrium with NAM, and the contradiction
would immediately arise.
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Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist a level of ability x˜ ∈
[
x
′
, x
]
such that the
payoff from ai and aj is the same.
Finally, consider a deviation to some aj with j /∈ I∗. Take the closest smaller
market in I∗ to aj, call it ai.
i := arg max
h∈I∗\{h≥j}
h
It can be argued that the belief β (aj) has to place all support on type λi, which, since
all markets in between ai and aj are empty, is also equal to λj. Assume not, and first,
say that β (aj) is supported on another type λ ∈ Λh with h ∈ I∗ and h > j. From the
partitional equilibrium, λ > λi. If this type finds a deviation to aj weakly beneficial
for at least some Q, then, the set of Q ∈ [0, 1] such that this is true is an interval
[Qλ, 1], with Qλ
Q (ah)R (ah, λ) = QλR (aj, λ)
However, the fact that R (ah, λ) /R (aj, λ) is increasing in λ - by logsupermodularity
- implies that, ∀λ′ ∈ Λh and λ′ < λ,
Q (ah)R
(
ah, λ
′)
< QλR
(
aj, λ
′) .
That is, all types in Λh lower than λ would strictly benefit from deviating at Qλ, and,
similarly for some Q > Qλ. Hence the set of Qs such that λ would deviate is a subset
of the set of Qs at which these types would deviate. Because this set not maximal, β
should place no density at λ. A contradiction.
Assume instead β (aj) is supported on some λ ∈ Λh with h ∈ I∗ and h < j. A
similar argument applies. In this case, ∀λ′ ∈ Λh and λ′ > λ,
Q (ah)R
(
ah, λ
′)
< QλR
(
aj, λ
′) .
Given what the off-equilibrium deviation attracts, condition (iii) from the Propo-
sition guarantees that no VC offers aj. 
Proof Proposition 3. (i). The proof of part (i) proceeds in two steps.
(Step 1). First, call I the equilibrium exhibiting lower ratio Qi/Qj for any two
(i, j) with i > j, with II being the other equilibrium. Use the superscripts I and II
to denote the limits of the equilibrium partitions Xi and Λi under equilibrium I and
II. It can be shown that, for any i, λIi > λIIi . This is easily seen by looking at the
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entrepreneur’s λi indifference condition. Rewrite it as:
R (ai+1, λi)
R (ai, λi)
= Qi
Qi+1
(9)
Condition (10) has to hold under both equilibrium values λIi and λIIi . The left hand
side is increasing in λi by logsupermodularity. The right hand side is assumed to be
larger under equilibrium I. Therefore, λIi > λIIi for all i.
(Step 2). Given λIi > λIIi , it can be proven that welfare is higher under equilibrium
I. Notice that, for any i, average quality is higher under I. That is:
E
[
R (ai , λ) |λIi−1 ≤ λ ≤ λIi+1
]
> E
[
R (ai , λ) |λIIi−1 ≤ λ ≤ λIIi+1
]
.
Since equilibrium requires that VCs select ai to maximise total returns, it must be
that each one is strictly better off under I compared to II.
(ii). For part (ii), similarly call I the equilibrium exhibiting lower ratioWi/Wj for
any two (i, j) with i > j, with II being the other equilibrium. Use the superscripts I
and II to denote the limits of the equilibrium partitions Xi and Λi under equilibrium
I and II. It can be shown that, for any i, λIi > λIIi . To prove this, assume this is
not the case. That is, assume that, for at least some i , λIi ≤ λIIi . First focus on the
case where the inequality is strict for some i. Take the largest i such that this holds.
Rewrite the indifference condition for the indifferent type, λi , as:
R (ai+1, λi)
R (ai, λi)
= Wi
Wi+1
F (λi+1)− F (λi)
F (λi)− F (λi−1) . (10)
When λi is lower, the left hand side of (11) decreases (due to logsupermodularity).
Wi/Wi+1 is higher in equilibrium I by assumption. Hence, it must be that the ratio
(F (λi+1)− F (λi)) / (F (λi)− F (λi−1)) is lower under I. The numerator is higher
under I , since i is the largest submarket for which λIi ≤ λIIi (this is also true in case
i = N − 1 and hence λi+1 = λ¯). Therefore, it must be that λIi−1 < λIIi−1, giving a
contradiction. It remains to show that it is impossible that λIi = λIIi for all i. Assume
this is the case. This would imply that under the two equilibria, the left hand side
of (16) stays constant, as well as the ratio (F (λi+1)− F (λi)) / (F (λi)− F (λi−1)).
Because Wi/Wi+1 is not the same under the two equilibria, the desired contradiction
arises.
Given λIi > λIIi , welfare is higher under equilibrium I, as proven for part (i). This
completes the proof. 
Proof Proposition 4. First, observe that, for any allocation described by a cutoff
x0, so that VCs are assigned to the high attention market if and only if their ability
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is above x0, the sorting outcome is described by a unique, increasing, and continu-
ously differentiable cutoff λ0 (x0). To see why, rewrite the entrepreneur’s indifference
condition as:
R (a1, λ0)
R (a0, λ0)
= W0 (x0)
W1(x0)
(1− F (λ0))
F (λ0)
. (11)
The left hand side of (12) is continuous and strictly increasing in λ0 by assumption
(as R is continuous in both arguments and assumed to be log-supermodular in this
section). The right hand side is continuous and strictly decreasing in λ0. Recall that
W0 =
´ x0
x
mx0dG (x), and W1 =
´ x
x0
mx1dG (x). Therefore, the ratio W0 (x0) /W1(x0)
is continuous and decreasing in x0, as ∂mxi /∂x is positive and continuous, and the
distribution g is continuous.
Denote x∗0 the largest equilibrium cutoff x0, which is, by Proposition 2, the Pareto
superior equilibrium. The proof proceeds in two steps.
(Step 1). First, I show that any allocation x˜0 < x∗0 delivers lower welfare than
x∗0. Notice that welfare induced by an allocation x˜0 is bounded above by what total
returns would be if, given the sorting subgame, VCs would optimally select fund size.
Formally:
V (x˜0) ≤
ˆ
x
max {mx0E [R (a0, λ) |λ ≤ λ0 (x˜0)] ,mx1E [R (a1, λ) |λ ≥ λ0 (x˜0)]} dG (x) .
Hence, for all x˜0 < x∗0:
V (x∗0) =
ˆ
x
max {mx0E [R (a0, λ) |λ ≤ λ0 (x∗0 )] ,mx1E [R (a1, λ) |λ ≥ λ0 (x∗0 )]} dG (x) > V (x˜0) .
(Step 2). Second, I show that the Second Best Problem can be improved by a
marginal increase in x0, starting from x∗0. To see why, write the objective function:
V (x0) = W0 (x0)E [R (a0, λ) |λ ≤ λ0 (x0)] +W1 (x0)E [R (a1, λ) |λ ≥ λ0 (x0)] .
So,
∂V (x0)
∂x0
∣∣∣x0=x∗0 = (mx00 E [R (a0, λ) |λ ≤ λ0 (x0)]−mx01 E [R (a1, λ) |λ ≥ λ0 (x0)]) g (x0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
(
W0(x∗0)
∂(E[R(a0,λ)|λ≤λ0(x∗0)])
∂λ0
+W1(x∗0)
∂(E[R(a1,λ)|λ≥λ0(x∗0)])
∂λ0
)
∂λ0(x∗0)
∂x0
> 0,
where the term in the first bracket is zero because x∗0 is indifferent in equilibrium.

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Stable Equilibria. A fixed point of the vector function Θ - defined in Section 4.1 - is
attracting if and only if all eigenvalues of the the Jacobian of Θ - denoted J (Θ) - are
smaller than one in absolute value. Therefore, in this context a necessary condition
for
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
to be an attracting fixed point is that the determinant of the 2x2 matrix
J (Θ) is smaller than one in absolute value. Formally, the condition is:
∣∣∣∣∣∣det
 ηx0 (x˜0, λ˜0)+ 1 ηλ0 (x˜0, λ˜0)
µx0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
µλ0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
+ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 1.
Since ηx0 and µλ0 are always positive, for all stable equilibria it has to be the case
that:
ηλ0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
µx0
(
x˜0 ˜, λ0
)
< ηx0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
µλ0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
. (12)
An adjustment process. Consider the following dynamic adjustment process. Take
an initial (x0, λ0). Impose that, starting from it, the cutoff x0 increases (decreases)
proportionally to the benefit (loss) from selecting a large fund size against a small size,
given the rest of the agents are following the strategy described by the two cutoffs
(x0, λ0). Similarly, impose that the cutoff λ0 increases (decreases) proportionally to
the benefit (loss) from searching in the low attention market versus searching for
high attention. This process defines a system of autonomous differential equations as
below:

x˙0 (t) = −b
[
mx0(t)1 (E [R (a1, λ) | λ ≥ λ0 (t)]− R0)−mx0(t)0 (E [R (a0, λ) | λ ≤ λ0 (t)]− R0)
]
λ˙0 (t) = −b
[
W1(x0(t))
1−F (λ0(t))R (a1, λ0 (t))−
W0(x0(t))
F (λ0(t)) R (a0, λ0 (t))
]
(13)
for some b > 0. Notice the right hand side of the first part of (14) is −bη (x0, λ0) and
the right hand side of the second part is −bµ (x0, λ0). One interpretation is that at
each point in time a fraction of the population readjusts their strategies, starting from
a state where all agents are following cutoff strategies and taking those strategies as
given. An equilibrium of the game -
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
- is clearly a constant solution to the
system. One can then study local stability of such equilibria.
An equilibrium
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
is locally asymptotically stable if all eigenvalues of the
Jacobian:
−b
 ηx0 (x˜0, λ˜0) ηλ0 (x˜0, λ˜0)
µx0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
µλ0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
) 
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have negative real parts.24 Since the trace of this matrix is:
−b
(
ηx0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
+ µλ0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
))
< 0
local asymptotic stability of
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
is implied by:
ηλ0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
µx0
(
x˜0 ˜, λ0
)
< ηx0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
µλ0
(
x˜0, λ˜0
)
which is exactly equation (13).
Proof of Proposition 5. First, rewrite the system characterizing the vector of
equilbrium cutoffs (x0, λ0) as:
mx01 (E [R (a1, λ) | λ ≥ λ0]− R0)−mx00 (E [R (a0, λ) | λ ≤ λ0]− R0) = 0 (14)
W1 (x0)
1− F (λ0)R (a1, λ0)−
W0 (x0, x)
F (λ0)
R (a0, λ0) = 0 (15)
where I have made explicit in (15) the dependence of W0 on x. Infact, notice that
W0 =
´ x0
x
mx0dG (x), so ∂W0∂x = −mx0g (x) < 0. Call Φ (x0, λ0, x) the left-hand side of
(14) and Ψ (x0, λ0, x) the left-hand side of (15). Using the Implicit Function Theorem,
one gets that:
∂λ0
∂x
< 0 ⇐⇒ Φλ0 (x0, λ0, x) Ψx0 (x0, λ0, x) < Φx0 (x0, λ0, x) Ψλ0 (x0, λ0, x)
which is implied by condition (13). Similarly, for x0 one gets that:
∂x0
∂x
> 0 ⇐⇒ Φx0 (x0, λ0, x)Φλ0 (x0, λ0, x)
Ψλ0 (x0, λ0, x)−Ψλ0 (x0, λ0, x) > 0
and, using condition (13) because we are looking at stable equilibria, it follows that
the sign of ∂x0/∂x is the same as that Φλ0 (x0, λ0, x), which is positive if and only if
φλ˜ (a1, a0, λ0) is positive.
The effect on welfare directly follows from the fact that, as λ0 increases, average
quality in both submarkets increases. Since VCs choose fund size to maximize returns,
it must be that all of them are better off after the change in λ0. Hence, for all equilibria
V (E, s∗, σ∗) increases. 
24For details see for example Theorem 2.5 from Acemoglu (2008).
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Proof of Corollary 1. Consider the distribution of returns for a given equilbrium
(x0 (x) , λ0 (x)) . The Cdf of the returns is a step function, denoted Y , taking the form:
Y (r;x) =

W0(x0(x),x)
W0(x0(x),x)+W1(x0(x))
F(R−1(r))
F (R−1(R(a1,λ0(x)))) if r ≤ R (a1, λ0 (x))
W0(x0(x))
W0(x0(x),x)+W1(x0(x)) +
W1(x0(x))
W0(x0(x),x)+W1(x0(x))
F(R−1(r))−F(R−1(R(a1,λ0(x))))
F(R−1(R(a1,λ¯)))−F (R−1(R(a1,λ0(x)))) o.w.
where W0 (x0 (x) , x) =
´ x0(x)
x
mx0dG (x) , and W1 (x0 (x)) =
´ x¯
x0(x) m
x
1dG (x). The
associated Pdf - y - is given by:
y (R;x) =

W0(x0(x),x)
W0(x0(x),x)+W1(x0(x))
f(R−1(λ))
F (R−1(R(a1,λ0(x)))) if r ≤ R (a0, λ0 (x))
0 if r ∈ (R (a0, λ0 (x)) , R (a1, λ0 (x)))
W1(x0(x))
W0(x0(x),x)+W1(x0(x))
f(R−1(λ))
F(R−1(R(a1,λ¯)))−F (R−1(R(a1,λ0(x)))) o.w.
Since ∂λ0/∂x < 0 , it has to be the case that W0/W1 increases, so to satisfy the en-
trepreneur’s indifference condition. Therefore, W0/ (W0 +W1) is now higher. Hence,
at r = R (a0, λ0 (x)) , Y (r;x) has increased.
Consider now the expectation of r conditional on being larger than R (a0, λ0 (x)).
This is ˆ R(a1,λ¯)
R(a1,λ0(x))
rdY (r;x) / (1− Y (R (a1, λ0 (x)) ;x)) ,
which is higher the higher is λ0 (x). The same is true when conditioning on r being
above any number in the set (R (a0, λ0 (x)) , R (a1, λ0 (x))). The conditional expecta-
tion of given that r is above some rˆ > R (a1, λ0 (x)) is instead given by
ˆ R(a1,λ¯)
rˆ
rdY (r;x) / (1− Y (rˆ;x)) ,
which is unaffected by the change in x because (1− Y (rˆ;x)) is equivalent to the
function
´ R(a1,λ¯)
rˆ dY (r;x), that is computed as:
W1 (x0 (x))
W0 (x0 (x) , x) +W1 (x0 (x))
ˆ R(a1,λ¯)
rˆ
f (R−1 (r)) dr
F
(
R−1
(
R
(
a1, λ¯
)))
− F (R−1 (R (a1, λ0 (x))))
which therefore gives:
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´ R(a1,λ¯)
rˆ rdY (r;x)
(1− Y (rˆ;x)) =
´ R(a1,λ¯)
rˆ rf (R−1 (r)) dr
F
(
R−1
(
R
(
a1, λ¯
)))
− F (R−1 (rˆ))

Proof of Proposition 6. The system characterizing the two cutoffs (x0, λ0) is given
by:
mx01 [ρ (E [R (a1, λ) | λ ≥ λ0]−R0) + (1− ρ) (ER (a1, λ)−R0)] −
−mx00 [ρ (E [R (a0, λ) | λ ≤ λ0]−R0) + (1− ρ) (ER (a1, λ)−R0)] = 0
(16)
W1 (x0)
1− F (λ0)R (a1, λ0)−
W0 (x0)
F (λ0)
R (a0, λ0) = 0 (17)
Notice that the entrepreneur’s indifference condition is unaffected by ρ. Call Φ (x0, λ0, ρ)
the left-hand side of (16) and Ψ (x0, λ0) the left-hand side of (17). Using the Implicit
Function Theorem, one gets that:
∂x0
∂ρ
< 0 ⇐⇒ Φλ0 (x0, λ0, x) Ψx0 (x0, λ0, x) < Φx0 (x0, λ0, x) Ψλ0 (x0, λ0, x)
which is implied by condition (13), and hence it holds for every stable equilibria. 
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Chapter 2 - Closed-End Funds and Commitment in
Venture Capital
Abstract
In this Chapter I extend the model developed in Chapter 1 to a dynamic
setting, where projects need time to develop and produce returns. VCs can
choose to enter in a short-term contract with investors, giving them access to
investors liquidity for a given period of time, and an open credit relationship
that allows them to raise money from investors at any point in time. The
model illustrates a novel advantage of closed, finite-horizon funds, which emerge
in equilibrium even when they are socially undesirable: they attract the best
entrepreneurs, who value the most the exclusive relationship that only a closed-
end fund can guarantee. The interpretation is that VCs benefit from committing
to a size in the first place.
1 Introduction
Differently from, for example, mutual funds and hedge funds, private equity funds
- like venture capital partnerships - are finitely lived: VCs’ activity is restricted by
a clear deadline when their investments must be exited, and capital does not flow
in and out of a VC fund. Investors and VCs form a limited partnership. This ar-
rangement can have the negative consequence of forcing VCs to give up investment
opportunities that are discovered too late in the fund’s life, and when much of the
committed capital has been already invested. Kandel et al. (2011) find suggestive
evidence that being closer to the end of the fund induces myopic behavior by VCs.
Barrot (2016) finds that the length of the investment horizon is associated to selection
of different startups, meaning that it has real effects on the VCs’ investment strategy.
The common understanding is that such fund configuration, despite introducing some
potential distortions, helps mitigating agency problems between limited partners - the
investors - and the VCs. But one could ask whether in absence of such problems, a
different arrangement would emerge. In other words, is forming closed-ended fund
also in the VC’s best interest, or is it just an unavoidable cost?
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To answer this question, in this Chapter I accommodate the model described in
Chapter 1 to a dynamic setting where projects don’t realize returns immediately, VCs
can match to one entrepreneur every period, and follow the projects until they are
ready to produce returns. I allow VCs to choose between a short-term contract and a
long-lasting, open credit relationship with the investors. In the former case, VCs are
forced to wait until the current project has realized its returns before they can get
to manage a new fund, and go back to the market for entrepreneurs. In the latter,
they have access to investors’ money and can add a new project to the fund while
the first investment is still ongoing. Projects under management of a VC that is in
a short-term contract with investors won’t overlap.1 Thus, such contract allows the
VC to commit its attention to the current project.
I show that there is no equilibrium where every VC is in a long-lasting credit
relationship with investors, even when this is the most efficient arrangement. This
happens because a deviating VC, by choosing the short-term contract - that is, by
forming a closed-end fund - will be able to skim the market and attract the very best
entrepreneurs, being them those who are willing to pay the highest search friction in
order to match to a “committed” VC. This provides a new rationale for the prevalence
of closed, finite-horizon funds in venture capital, as opposed to the open funds we
observe in other contexts where fund managers invest in public securities and are not
subject to a two-sided matching problem.
Relation to the Literature. The paper contributes to a literature focusing on
the most observed features and contractual arrangements at the basis of investment
funds: in Stein (2005) open-ended fund structure emerges because mutual fund man-
agers compete for money flows and the best ones can credibly signal their ability by
offering an open-end structure that can prevent them from fully exploiting arbitrage
opportunities; Axelson et al. (2009) explain why buyout funds exhibit a mix of out-
side debt and equity financing in a setting where the key tension is between imposing
discipline to privately informed managers while at the same time making efficient use
of their superior screening ability.
Roadmap: Section 2 introduces the model; followed by the characterization of the
equilibria; Equilibria are ranked in terms of welfare achieved and compared to a second
best solution in Section 3; Section 4 explores the effects of entry of new VCs in the
1This is a stylized representation. Nonetheless, while it is true that a fund manager can open
new funds in parallel, fundraising is typically time consuming, which strongly limits the extent to
which VCs can put projects “on hold” until enough money is raised; the practice is also limited by
contractual restrictions that are meant to protect current investors, so new funds can’t be raised
before the current has been substantially invested.
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economy; Section 5 uses results in previous sections to analyse the choice between
short and long-term investors-VC relationships, in an appropriately accommodated
setup; Section 6 concludes; All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
In the next two subsections I will describe the physical environment, the timing and
strategies, and comment on the interpretation of the two types of fund structures VCs
will be assumed to choose among.
2.1 Setup
Agents. Time - denoted t - is countably infinite. The economy consists of long-lived
homogeneous venture capitalists (henceforth VCs), identical investors and ex-ante
identical entrepreneurs. There is an arbitrarily large measure of investors. Each
investor is endowed with one unit of money in every period. The initial measure of
VCs in the economy is fixed and normalized to one. Entrepreneurs are in large supply,
and can enter the market upon paying startup cost c. If they do, they draw a type λ,
the quality of the project they own, from a continuous distribution f strictly positive
on the entire support
[
λ, λ
]
⊂ R+.
Projects. All projects need only one unit of money to become a firm. It takes two
periods for each project, independently on its quality, to develop and produce returns.
Once a project has produced returns, the match expires. Each project’s return, R,
is assumed to be a function of attention, a, and of the project’s quality, λ. Call this
function R (a, λ). As in Chapter 1, I assume Ra (a, λ) and Rλ (a, λ) > 0. I further
assume that R (a, λ) is twice continuously differentiable in its arguments. Moreover,
assume that R (a, λ) is logsupermodular.
Diseconomies of Scale. To capture the same quality-quantity trade-off as in Chap-
ter 1, I assume VCs attention into a particular project is determined by whether he
has dealt with another one in any period of the project’s life span. Denote the levels
of a with and without overlapping projects ah and al respectively, with ah > al.
Fund Structure. At the beginning of each period, managers approaching investors
can opt for either of two fund structures. In one case, they can choose an open credit
line that allows them, at any time t to have the necessary cash to finance a new
project. Alternatively, they can form a closed fund, with a finite, two periods long
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horizon. In the latter case, a fund consists essentially of a single investment, that
matures returns two periods from the initial formation. Crucially, a VC that formed
a closed fund at time t will not be able to raise any additional money before time
t+ 2.
Matching and Information. Entrepreneurs are privately informed about their
type, λ. Assume a VC can only match to one entrepreneur in every period. It follows
that a VC searching for an entrepreneur can be in either of two states: he can be
unmatched, or already be dealing with a project that is currently at its intermediate
stage. Entrepreneurs observe what type of fund is every VC managing, and whether
the VC is altready matched. VCs that are the same in these two, binary, dimensions
form a submarket where entrepreneurs will select into, possibly depending on their
type. Finally, assume that as many matches as possible are formed in each submarket;
that is, the number of matches as a function of the measure of entrepreneurs searching,
qe, and the measure of money available (or “vacancies”), qk, is given by M (qk, qe) =
min {qk, qe}.
Payoffs, Strategies and Timing. VCs offer investors a contract that specifies a
fund structure and a management fee, p, that they receive from investos. Investors
can accept the contract or reject and invest in an alternative technology delivering
constant returns R0. Normalize R0 to zero. For every project invested with their
money, investors will get a fixed share α ∈ (0, 1) of the returns. Entrepreneurs
observe VCs decision and choose whether or not to pay the startup cost. Those who
do, can direct their search towards different VCs. Conditional on being matched, they
receive the residual - (1− α) - share of the returns from their projects. All agents are
risk neutral and maximize the sum of expected returns, with common discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1).
Population. At every time t a measure N of new VCs enter the market; at random,
an equal measure of VCs dies. Investors are infinitely lived. At each t a new generation
of entrepreneurs is born. Those who choose not to enter the market, leave the economy
forever. Those who enter and don’t get matched die. Those who enter and get
matched, receive their payoff after two periods and leave the economy forever.
2.2 Interpreting the Closed and Open Fund Structure
In case a VC opts for a closed fund strcture, a fund consists essentially of a single
investment, that matures returns two periods from the initial formation. It is essential
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for the analysis that a VC that is in such contract with the investors can’t raise
additional money before the investment has produced returns. One can imagine that
an investor writing this type contract will have its wealth at the intermediate period
invested on the alternative asset. If approached by the VC in the intermediate period,
the investor wouldn’t have the liquidity to provide the VC with the money to start a
new project. This is realistic: pension funds (representing a large share of investors
in venture capital) usually meet capital calls by selling positions in liquid indexes.2
Another interpretation is that in the typical private equity partnernship, many -
dispersed - investors own a share of the fund. This makes it harder for VCs to
agree with original investors on changes to the size of the fund. Whichever is the
interpretation, all that matters is that a short-term contract creates an endogenous
commitment not to start a new project before the original has produced its returns.
3 Analysis
Note that, as it occurs in the model presented in Chapter 1, VCs’ choice maximizes
the fund’s total returns, because they can set fees so to hold investors to their par-
ticipation constraint. Therefore a VC’s objective is to maximize the discounted sum
of expected excess returns. Observe also that the relevant dimension from the en-
trepreneurs’ perspective on which VCs differ is how much attention will the VC even-
tually devote to their project. Each level of attention will hence define a submarket
where entrepreneurs can select into.
Summary of the Game. Let me now summarize the timing of the game:
• At each time t newborn VCs and pennyless ones approach investors, choose
a fund structure, and contract over the fee p that investors pay them upon
realization of each project’s returns. Managers opting for a closed fund can’t
approach investors before the project they are currently financing has produced
returns.
• Entrepreneurs observe investors’ strategy and make the entry choice. Those
who enter the market privately observe their type λ and direct their search.
• At t+ 1 managers who chose a open credit line have the money to search for a
new project. Every match formed in t generates returns R (a, λ) at time t + 2.
By then, t-generation entrepreneurs who matched leave the market forever.
2See Robinson and Sensoy (2016).
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The main difficulty is that a matched VC’s behavior - whether to start a new project
at the intermediate period - will in principle depend on the quality of projects he is
expecting to be matched to.
Assumption A1. (1 + δ)R
(
al, λ
)
> R
(
ah, λ
)
∀λ.
The assumption above limits the extent to which a VC’s human capital is destroyed
when working on parallel projects. Under A1, keeping quality fixed, it is always optimal
to start a new project every period. In turn this means that a VC that expects to
attract the same type of projects is always going to search for new ones to finance,
provided he has the necessary cash. Later on in the analysis I will restrict attention
to a class of equilibria in which entrepreneurs sort into different VCs in a way that is
constant over time. In such equilibria, a VC that follows the same strategy over time
will always attract the same pool of entrepreneurs. Therefore, since the condition in
A1 holds for every possible λ, VCs in the open credit relationship with investors will
actively search in every period.
It is worth noting that, if instead the inequality in A1 was reversed, the choice by a
VC of which contract to enter with the investors would be inconsequential: managers
would never start a new project before the current has reached termination; the fact
that they can’t access liquidity at any point in time would not constrain their choices.
Under A1, in those equilibria I will study, entrepreneurs that are searching for
a match will effectively face the choice between two distinct markets: one where
“uncommitted” VCs will provide attention al, and the other where attention is at ah,
composed of fund managers that entered closed fund, who will not be able to search
before the original investment has matured.
The Sorting Subgame. I first derive sorting behavior when a positive measure of
vacancies is available in both markets. Normalize the mass of VCs to one and denote
γt the share of managers running a finite-horizon fund at time t. It is immediate
from results in previous sections to observe that equilibrium search behavior at time
t is then characterized by a threshold λ∗ such that entrepreneurs search in the high-
attention market if and only if λ ≥ λ∗. This is due to log-supermodularity of R (a, λ).
The threshold is implicitly defined by the equation:
γt
1− λ∗R
(
ah, λ∗
)
= 1− γt
λ∗
R
(
al, λ∗
)
. (1)
Lemma 1. The solution to (1) is unique: given a share of managers with finite-
horizon funds γt, there is a unique equilibrium of the sorting subgame.
In principle, VCs might choose different contracts at different times of their lives,
44
and I allow for that. However, for the sake of simplicity, I restrict attention to equi-
libria where, whenever VCs are indifferent which fund structure to choose, the share
of VCs going for either option stays constant. I show that such equilibria are always
possible to construct, provided at a certain time t agents are indifferent about which
contract to choose, thanks to the assumption that new VCs enter the market at each
t.
Definition 1. A stationary equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the shares of VCs
choosing either fund structure is independent on t.
Lemma 2. If an equilibrium where γt = z ∈ (0, 1) for some t exists, then there exists
a measure of newborns - N - such that an equilibrium where γt = z for all t exists.
Let me focus on the case when selecting the best entrepreneur is appealing to the
VC. Formally, this means imposing the following restriction.
Assumption A2. R
(
ah, λ¯
)
> (1 + δ)E
[
R
(
al, λ
)]
.
Under A2 the returns from following the best entrepreneur exclusively are higher
than those from financing two average projects in two subsequent periods. Finally,
recall the definition from Chapter 1 of the function φ
(
a, a
′
, λ˜
)
. When a and a′ take
the values ah and al respectively, this is given by:
φ
(
a, a
′
, λ˜
)
:=
αE
[
R
(
ah, λ
)
|λ ≥ λ˜
]
αE
[
R (al, λ) |λ ≤ λ˜
]
that is the ratio between the returns per dollar invested into a fund that provides high
attention and attracts entrepreneurs with quality above some λ˜ , and the returns per
dollar invested into one that provides low attention and attracts entrepreneurs below
the same cutoff.
It is now possible to state the main result of this Chapter.
Proposition 1. (Equilibrium Fund Structure).
(i) There is no stationary equilibrium where all VC choose the open credit line.
(ii) The equilibrium’s measure of VCs with finite-horizon funds, γ, is the solution
to the equation:
E
[
R
(
ah, λ
)
|λ ≥ λ∗ (γ)
]
= (1 + δ)E
[
R
(
al, λ
)
|λ ≤ λ∗ (γ)
]
whenever it exists.
(iii) When E
[
R
(
ah, λ
)]
≥ (1 + δ)R
(
al, λ
)
, there is a stationary equilibrium
where every VC chooses the finite-horizon fund.
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Notice that, because of A2, if the function φ
(
ah, al, λ˜
)
was decreasing in λ˜ - as
it is in Example 1 - the condition in (ii) would have no solution, while condition
(iii) would always hold. This means that a situation where every VC chooses the
finite-horizon fund would be the unique equilibrium.
The picture below provides a description of the two types of equilibria as in Propo-
sition 1.
Figure 1: Left: On the horizontal axes, I represent the measure of VCs selecting the open fund
structure. On the vertical axes, the function φ
(
ah, al, λ∗ (γ)
)
is represented, where λ∗ (γ) is the
unique solution to the entrepreneur’s indifference condition as in equation (1), as a function of γ.
A situation where γ = 1 is not an equilibrium, as in that case the function would take value:
R
(
ah, λ¯
)
/E
[
R
(
al, λ
)]
which is assumed to be larger than 1 + δ. In this example, the function φ is
monotonically increasing in λ˜, therefore it increases as γ increases, as this induces a larger cutoff in
the entrepreneur’s strategy. Hence, the unique equilibrium is an interior one. Right: In this example
the function is monotonically decreasing in λ˜. Since R
(
ah, λ¯
)
/E
[
R
(
al, λ
)]
is larger then 1 + δ, so
will be the ratio E
[
R
(
ah, λ
)]
/R
(
al, λ
)
. Since, when every VC is in the closed contract, deviating
to the open fund structure would attract the worse type - λ - it follows that in this example the
unique equilbrium is one where every VC opts for the closed contract, that is γ = 0.
Similarly to how established in the general static model, the motive to attract
better entrepreneurs generates an inefficiency, as VCs don’t internalize the aggre-
gate effect - due to equilibrium sorting - of their choices. In particular, one natural
and policy relevant question would be whether allowing these short-term contracts is
desirable. It turns out that, under A1, banning the short-term contracts is always
beneficial.
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Proposition 2. (Banning finite-horizon funds). Every equilibrium of the game
delivers lower welfare than the case where every VC chooses the open credit line. That
is, banning finite-horizon funds improves welfare.
It is easy to see why the “corner” equilibrium where every VC chooses the short-
term contract is welfare detrimental. Infact, notice that under A1, the choice of which
contract to sign involves a simple trade-off: on the one hand, starting a new project
every period allows the VC to make the best use of his human capital, as the dilution
in attention is assumed to be small; on the other, committing to an exclusive relation
helps the VC attract the best entrepreneurs. However, in equilibrium this commitment
confers no benefit at all, since every VC will look alike. In all interior equilibria, VCs
that opt for the infinite-horizon fund are attracting a negatively selected subset of
entrepreneurs. Since expected returns are ultimately the same to all VCs - as they have
to be indifferent which contract to choose - it follows that expected aggregate returns
would be higher if all VCs would choose the long-term contract and get matched with
the average entrepreneur.
4 Conclusion
In this Chapter, I have used the results from Chapter 1 to analyse the equilibrium
choice between a closed, finite-horizon fund, versus an open, firm-like investors-VC
relationship, in a simple dynamic version of the model. From the VC’s point of
view, finite-horizon funds come at the cost of giving up investment opportunities
arriving when the current fund is still ongoing; entrepreneurs value this commitment,
because it guarantees exclusive attention. A situation where all VCs opt for the open
fund unravels, even when this would be the welfare maximising solution, due to the
incentive to skim the market and attract the best entrepreneurs, who are the most
willing to pay the highest search friction and get exclusive attention. Similarly, one
where every VC has the closed fund is sustainable as an equilibrium outcome, because
a deviation to the open-end fund would attract the worse entrepreneurs. This result
suggests another reason why VCs raise funds with a finite horizon and with explicit
limits on the investments that they can make while the current fund is still ongoing.
They might benefit from committing to a size in the first place.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. It is convenient to rewrite (1) as:
R
(
ah, λ∗
)
R (al, λ∗) =
1− γt
γt
(1− F (λ∗))
F (λ∗) (2)
The left-hand side of (2) is continuous and strictly increasing in λ∗ by assumption
(as R is continuous in both arguments and assumed to be log-supermodular in this
section). The right hand side is continuous and strictly decreasing in λ∗. In particular,
notice the left-hand side is positive and finite for all λ∗ ∈
[
λ, λ¯
]
. The right hand side
is zero as λ∗ → λ¯ and tends to infinity as λ∗ → λ 
Proof of Lemma 2. Take any period t where a share zt ∈ (0, 1) of the VCs who have
to choose fund structure opts for the open fund, and the residual selects the closed-end
fund. Assume that - at time t - given the strategy profile in all periods other than
t - there is a share of actively searching VCs - yt ∈ (0, 1) - that will also search at
t + 1. This share will define how many VCs will be in the market where attention is
al, relatively to how many are in the market where attention is ah. By Lemma 1, this
induces a unique cutoff in the entrepreneurs’ strategy. Denote it λt (yt). Given that
this is an equilibrium, it has to be the case that:
E
[
R
(
ah, λ
)
|λ ≥ λt (yt)
]
= (1 + δ)E
[
R
(
al, λ
)
|λ ≤ λt (yt)
]
(3)
To construct a stationary equilibrium, call L the measure of VCs that survive from
time t to time t+ 1 and are actively searching. A measure N of newborns enters the
economy. In a stationary equilibrium, one would have that zt = yt = z. Assign β
newborns to the open fund structure and (1− β) newborns to the closed-end fund.
It must hold that:
zL+ βN
zL+N = z. (4)
In order for β to be strictly in (0, 1), a necessary and sufficient condition is that:
N
L
> 1− z
Notice that L is bounded above by 1−N. It is easy to observe that - for any given z -
an N such that N/ (1−N) exceeds 1− z always exists. Given that z stays constant,
λt (yt) = λt (z) is also constant. Therefore condition (3) is satisfied at every t and
VCs are indifferent in every period between choosing either fund structure. 
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Proof of Proposition 1. (i). I first show that there is no equilibrium where every
manager has the open credit line. Take an equilibrium where γ = 1 and consider a
manager who deviates to a finite-horizon structure. If there is a Q
(
ah
)
for which
some λ benefits from deviating to ah, all types above λ would strictly deviate. This
means the manager must expect to attract type λ¯. This is profitable as long as:
R
(
ah, λ¯
)
> (1 + δ)E
[
R
(
al, λ
)]
which is true by assumption.
(ii). The second part of the Proposition follows from the fact that all VCs are
identical, therefore they must be indifferent in an interior equilibrium.
(iii). Finally, by an argument similar to that for part (i), when all managers
are in a short-term contract with investors, a deviation to the open credit line must
necesserily attract λ. This is not profitable as long as:
E
[
R
(
ah, λ
)]
≥ (1 + δ)R
(
al, λ
)

Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that the mass of VCs is normalized to one in this
section. Since all VCs are alike, ex-ante welfare, V , in the economy is the expected
equilibrium payoff to the VC. Consider first an equilibrium where every VC opts for
the finite-horizon fund. Welfare is:
V = E
[
R
(
ah, λ
)]
< (1 + δ)E
[
R
(
al, λ
)]
where the second inequality is a consequence of A3 once expectations are taken on
both sides. Hence this equilibrium is dominated by a situation where every VC is
forced to choose the open credit line. Second, consider welfare from any interior
equilibrium. This is given by:
V = E
[
R
(
ah, λ
)
|λ ≥ λ∗ (γ)
]
= (1 + δ)E
[
R
(
al, λ
)
|λ ≤ λ∗ (γ)
]
< (1 + δ)E
[
R
(
al, λ
)]
where the second inequality trivially holds since λ∗ (γ) < λ¯ , for any γ ∈ (0, 1). 
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Chapter 3 - A Model of Risk Taking with
Experimentation and Career Concerns∗
Abstract
We model an economy where managers create value through their abil-
ity to learn at an intermediate stage about the intrinsic profitability of a
risky investment. Managers are heterogeneous in their ability to extract
information from experiments, and care about their reputation. Their in-
centive to take on risk is distorted by career concerns, and can result in
under or over risk-taking. This is determined by whether discarding a risky
project following the experiment is more typical of better managers. Our
result is in contrast with Holmstrom (1999) where managers’ ability affects
the project’s success rate, and career concerns can only produce inefficiently
low risk-taking. We show that the inefficiency is reduced in one extension
of the model, where the market can also observe the outcome of similar
projects. The novel implication is that the markets more plagued by career
concerns distortions are those where managers engage in more idiosyncratic
activities.
1 Introduction
Investing in young and innovative firms involves large uncertainty.1 The Venture
Capital financing model offers a solution to deal with the uncertainty inherent
to the innovation process: venture capitalists (henceforth VCs) learn about firms
over time and hence can condition their financing on the information they acquire.
There is large evidence that they differ considerably in their ability to generate
returns (see Korteweg and Sorensen (2017)), and that positive past performance
by VCs increases their chances to raise a new fund (see the evidence in Kaplan and
Schoar (2005)), and the fees they receive from assets under management. Thus,
when making their choices they are arguably motivated by career concerns.
∗This chapter was co-authored with Gianpaolo Caramellino. We thank Leonardo Felli,
Francesco Nava, Konstantinos Tokis and participants at the LSE Sticerd Work in Progress Sem-
inar for helpful comments. All errors are our own.
1It has been calculated that around 50% of investments in venture capital exit with zero
value, and only about 10% of total investments effectively make all the returns to venture capital
vehicles (see Hall and Woodward (2010) and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013)).
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Do career concerns prevent VCs from efficiently using their ability to learn
about the projects they finance? And which markets are more prone to this prob-
lem? In this paper we show that career concerns generally lead to inefficient risk
taking. In particular, our novel contribution is to find that the type of experiments
that agents can undertake determines the direction of this inefficiency. Moreover,
as the number of agents financing projects that are linked to the same state of the
world increases, the inefficiency reduces. In the limit, the equilibrium risk taking
approaches the first best.
In the pages that follow we develop a framework where managers can choose
between a safe task and a risky one that can be abandoned after an experimenta-
tion phase. In our model, both the managers and the market do not know the state
of the world - a binary variable - that determines the return on the risky project.
Following the literature on career concerns, we also assume that the managers’
ability to run the experiment is unknown to all agents. The manager, indepen-
dently from his ability, privately receives an initial signal on the state of the world
and, based on this, he chooses whether to select the safe or the risky project. If
the risky task is chosen, both players observe the binary result of the experimental
phase and they abandon the project in case the experiment conveys a bad signal.
How informative the experiment is depends on the manager’s ability. On average,
a good manager extracts better information and produces higher returns from the
risky task. However, in some states of the world the good managers might perform
worse than a bad one. This happens when the high ability manager receives too
often the good signal from the experiment, when it would be better to abandon
the risky task, or when he receives too often the bad signal, when the state of
the world is positive and the continuation of the risky project would yield high
returns.
After characterizing the efficient risk taking rule, we turn the attention to the
equilibrium characterization. We first show that every equilibrium features a cutoff
strategy: the manager chooses to undertake the risky task if and only if the initial
private signal implies that the likelihood of being in the good state of the world is
high enough. Also the efficient risk taking rule prescribes a cutoff strategy. How-
ever, when we study the welfare properties of equilibria in our economy, we find
that they are intrinsically plagued by inefficient risk taking. The marginal man-
ager, rather than being purely motivated by financial returns, bases his choice also
on his expected reputation. Because sometimes good managers are biased towards
abandoning risky projects by mistake, the market could perceive the abandonment
of the risky project as a good sign about the managerial ability. If so, in anticipa-
tion of the reputational gain that will come from abandonment, also managers that
are not particularly optimistic about the state of the world might be induced to
choose the risky task. In other circumstances, when abandoning risky projects is
52
perceived by the market as a bad signal about manager’s ability, they are inclined
to a more prudent behaviour.
We show that our inefficiency result also holds when there are several managers
that, upon choosing the same risky task, run independent experiments. We then
show that the inefficiency is monotonically decreasing in the number of managers.
The intuition of this results builds on the fact that, by observing the outcome of
several experiments, the market figures out more often the true state of the world.
It becomes, indeed, less and less likely that all managers, correctly in the bad state
and by accident in the good one, abandon the risky project. When the market is
expected to observe more often the true state of the world, in turn, the manager’s
expected reputation gets closer to the prior; in other words the manager can no
longer use his private information to induce reputational gains. This is so because
the initial signal is independent on the manager’s ability and, thus, it offers no
additional information about this ability once the state of the world is observed.
Indeed, knowing the initial signal is useful to make better inference about the
manager’s talent only when the risky task is abandoned and the market doest
not get to know whether it happened correctly or by mistake. We conclude by
showing that in the limit when infinitely many managers operate, the inefficiency
disappears.
Relation to the Literature. We contribute to three different strands of the
literature. First, our paper is related to the recent theoretical literature on the
effects of imperfect information about fund managers’ abilities. Hochberg et al.
(2013) model investors-managers bargaining in a sequential environment where
incumbent investors are more informed than outside investors about managers’
skills. Marquez et al. (2014), instead, develop a signal-jamming model where fund
managers with differential ability to produce returns distorts the fund size decision
in order to affect entrepreneurs’ learning. Both papers can explain persistence in
venture capital funds’ returns. Similarly to these models, in our work there is
uncertainty about managers skills. However, we focus on how this problem distorts
managers’ investment decisions once the fund has already been set. Second, we
contribute to the discussion on experimentation in entrepreneurial finance. Recent
works, such as and Kerr et al. (2014) and Ewens et al. (2017), emphasize the role of
experimentation in nurturing the innovative activity of young firms. We provide a
somewhat darker view on the amount of experimentation observed in the venture
capital industry. In our model, there can be too much investments in experimental
projects.
Third, on a more abstract level, our work is related to the literature on the
effect of career concerns on managerial risk taking. In a seminal work, Holmstro¨m
(1999) shows that when managerial ability directly affects the project success rate
and managers care about their reputation, they underinvest in risky projects. A
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recent paper by Chen (2015) breaks this result by introducing managers’ private
information on their type and, hence, a signaling motive to take on risk. We
maintain, instead, the assumption that managers do not know their ability, but
we change the way in which managerial skills affect the returns from undertaking
the risky activity. In our modified setting we characterize necessary and sufficient
conditions for either type of inefficiency to emerge in equilibrium.
Finally, a setting where agents’ learning ability differs in quality improvement
- it is the same initially, but not in the intermediate stage - has been modeled by
Li (2007). Unlike in our setting, agents are privately informed about their ability
and - unlike in our setting - strategically change their actions as new information
arrives. A signalling motive gives them an incentive to give inconsistent reports,
similarly to what discarding the project would mean in our setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model
with one manager, we characterize the first best and the equilibria under career
concerns, and we study their efficiency properties. In section 3 we extend the
analysis to an economy with N managers. Section 4 concludes. Proofs that are
not in the main text are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
Managers, Projects, and Experiments. An agent, called manager, can choose
whether to undertake a safe project (S) or a risky project (R). The safe project
costs 0, the risky one costs c. The safe one produces returns of vs - with vs > c -
in any state of the world, while the risky project pays returns vr - with vr > vs -
in the good state and nothing in the bad state. Let x denote the state, and the
state space be X = {g, b}. The principal, often referred to as the market in this
paper, assesses the capability of the manager to anticipate the state of the world.
When the manager chooses the risky task, he runs at no cost an informative
experiment to gather additional information about the likelihood of success and,
based on the information she gets from the experiment, can decide whether to
pursue or to abandon the investment. Let i index the manager’s type: a high type
(i = h) is a manager that is able to extract better information from the experi-
ment compared to a low type (i = l) in a sense that will become clear in the next
lines. We assume that the experiment produces two signals only, denoted s, with
s ∈ S = {g, b}. An experiment is then fully described by the precision parameters
defining the probability of receiving the right signal in each of the two states of
the world, αi = P (s = g | x = g) and βi = P (s = b | x = b). Notice that
superscript i allows signals’ precision to differ depending on the manager’s type.
We further assume that αi, βi > 12 and that parameters are such that it is always
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optimal to follow the signal. Moreover, the cost of choosing the risky project, c,
is only paid when the manager decides not to abandon the project, that is, after
she observes a “good” signal (s = g), in which case returns realize.2 Otherwise, in
case of abandonment of the risky task because the signal from the experiment is
“bad” (s = b) , the return is zero.
Information and Timing. Prior to choosing which project to select, the man-
ager privately observes a signal ω ∈ R+ (which we will refer to as the project’s
intrinsic quality), generated from a density f defined over the support [ω, ω],
which is independent of his type. The manager then updates his prior probabil-
ity of success of the risky project to p (ω). Throughout the analysis we assume
that p′ (ω) > 0. The signal ω is the only dimension where the manager’s and the
market’s information don’t coincide.
Players share a common prior belief, ρ, on the probability that the manager
is high type. This probability, together with the precision parameters for the two
types of agents, ultimately determines the average probabilities of receiving the
right signal from the experiment in the two states of the world, that are defined
as α ≡ ραH + (1 − ρ)αL and β ≡ ρβH + (1 − ρ)βL. We denote instead γ the
market posterior belief about the manager’s type. If the safe project is chosen,
returns vs are realized and the market does not learn anything about the manager’s
ability. If the risky project is chosen, both the manager and the market observe
the realization of the experiment, s. The result of the experiment depends both
on the state of the world and on the manager’s type; however, conditional on
these two pieces of information, it is independent of the realization of the signal ω.
The final realization of the risky project is also common knowledge and it is the
outcome through which the market can update his prior on the manager’s ability.
We denote γl, γr the market’s posterior when the risky project is pursued and the
state of the world is revealed to be good and bad, respectively, and γ0 the market’s
posterior if the manager abandons the risky task.
Payoffs. The manager’s utility is increasing in profits from the project - which
we will call pi - and in the market’s belief about the probability he is the high type.
We will refer to the latter as the career concern motive. We assume the manager
is risk-neutral, and that the career concern motive enters linearly in his utility.
Specifically, we call the manager’s utility U (pi, γ). We assume the following form:
U (pi, γ) = (1− λ)κpi + λγ
2The net returns are then vr − c in case of success or −c in case of failure.
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with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Under this specification, the parameter λ measures the extent to
which the manager is motivated by career concerns, as opposed to maximizing the
payoff from the project. κ, the fraction of profits that the manager receives, is an
exogenous parameter.
Parameter Assumptions. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that parame-
ters are such that it is always optimal to follow the signal, that is, to continue the
risky project if and only if the experiment delivers the good signal. Specifically,
for this to be true we assume the following:3
αip (ω)
αip (ω) + (1− βi) (1− p (ω))vr − c > 0 ∀i, ω
(1− αi) p (ω)
(1− αi) p (ω) + βi (1− p (ω))vr − c < 0 ∀i, ω
It is evident that the higher α and β are, the more informative the experiment is.
However, it might be the case that in a specific environment, detecting a succesfull
project is relatively more beneficial than avoiding the loss associated to running a
bad one, or viceversa. This will depend on the primitives of the model. We define
the high type manager as the one that ensures higher expected profits. This leads
to the following restriction.
Condition 1. It must be the case that, for any ω:
p (ω)αhvr −
[(
αh + βh
)
p (ω)− βh
]
c ≥ p (ω)αlvr −
[(
αl + βl
)
p (ω) +−βl
]
c
This condition tells that, for a given ω, the expected return from the risky invest-
ment, obtained through the sum of the gain when the manager receives the right
signal in the good state, p (ω)αi(vr− c), and the loss in case the manager gets the
wrong signal in the bad state, − (1− βi) (1− p(ω)) c, is larger for the high type
manager. Notice that the condition holds when αh > αl and βh > βl, but could
also be satisfied in some cases where the high type receives a more precise signal
in one state, but a less precise one in the other state.
3Notice that, as the manager and market do not know the manager’s type, this assumption
is only a sufficient condition. That is, we might assume as well that for the average manager in
the economy would be optimal to follow the result of the experiment, but not for one of the two
types of agents.
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2.2 Efficient Benchmark and Equilibrium
In order to make welfare considerations about the equilibrium outcome, we first
characterize the efficient project choice, absent any career concerns motive. We
then show that, under certain parameter restrictions, every equilibrium is charac-
terized by a cutoff strategy: the manager chooses the risky project if and only if
the first period signal, ω, is higher than come cutoff, denoted ω∗.
Through the analysis we call σ : [ω ; ω]→ [0 ; 1] the manager’s mixed strategy;
σ(ω) denotes the probability that the manager chooses the risky project conditional
on observing the signal ω.
Efficient benchmark
We define ωFB the signal at which that expected payoffs from the risky and the
safe project are equalized. That is, ωFB solves
p(ωFB)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ωFB))(1− β)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(risk | ωFB)
= vs︸︷︷︸
pi(safe | ωFB)
(1)
It is easy to see that, due to the assumption that p′(ω) > 0, the expected re-
turns of the risky project are monotonically increasing in ω. Therefore, efficient
project choice prescribes to undertake the risky project if and only if ω ≥ ωFB.
Rearranging equation 1, we can characterize the efficient project selection rule as
follows.
Remark 2. The efficient project selection rule is described by:
σ(ω) =
 1 if ω ≥ ωFB ≡ p
−1
(
vs+(1−β)c
α(vr−c)+(1−β)c
)
0 otherwise
(2)
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is a pair specifying the manager’s strategy and
the principal’s posterior about managerial ability, (σ(ω), γ). Through the text,
we consider (Weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. As there might be cases where
beliefs are not well defined, we further impose the restriction that players’ beliefs
are the limiting beliefs computed using totally mixed strategies.4
4The (Weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept would not discipline beliefs in case the
risky project is never chosen in equilibrium.
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Let us first define and characterize the posteriors on manager’s ability that a
given strategy profile, σ(ω), would induce. The relevant events, as explained in the
previous section, are that a risky project succeeds, fails or is abandoned following
the experiment.
Call γr, γ0 and γl the posteriors on manager’s type when he chooses the risky
project, conditional on the project being successful, discarded, or failing, respec-
tively. These are derived in the Appendix and their expressions are given by:
γr ≡ P(θ = h |x = g, s = g) =
= ρ
´
ω
P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = h) p(ω)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´
ω
P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = i) p(ω)σ(ω) dF (ω)
γ0 ≡ P(θ = h | s = b) =
= ρ
´
ω
P(s = b |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´
ω
P(s = b |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
γl ≡ P(θ = h |x = b, s = g) =
= ρ
´
ω
P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = h) (1− p(ω))σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´
ω
P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = i) (1− p(ω))σ(ω) dF (ω)
The posteriors computed above are clearly affected by the equilibrium strategy
profile, since they depend on the set of individuals that choose to undertake the
risky project. The analysis simplifies once we observe that, under some conditions,
these sets take a simple interval representation. Notice infact, that since the
expected payoff when choosing the risky project is an increasing function of the
the realization of the signal ω, as long as career concern motives are not too strong,
it is optimal from the manager’s perspective to choose the risky project for high
values of ω. The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 1. There exists λ˜ ∈ (0 ; 1) such that, ∀λ < λ˜, the equilibrium σ(ω)
takes the form :
σ(ω) =
{
0 if ω < ω∗
1 if ω ≥ ω∗ (3)
for some ω∗ ∈ [ω; ω].
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In words, Proposition 1 states that when career concerns are not too strong, every
equilibrium will exhibit cutoff strategies. In this case, being optimistic enough
about the probability of facing a good state of the world (ω ≥ ω∗) is a necessary
and sufficient condition for undertaking the risky project (σ(ω) = 1). We will refer
to the manager receiving the signal ω∗ as the marginal manager.
Let us now restrict attention to cases where λ < λ˜. Let now p˜ be defined
as the perceived probability of facing the good state of the world, according to
the market, once the market observes that a risky project has been chosen. We
rewrite the beliefs following the choice of a risky project using the cutoff strategy
that agents follow in equilibrium. Moreover, in evaluating γ0, we use the fact that
P(s = b |ω, θ = i) = P(s = b |x = g, ω, θ = i)P(x = g |ω, θ = i) + P(s = b |x =
b, ω, θ = i)P(x = b |ω, θ = i) and the definition ´ ω
ω∗ P(x = g |ω) dF (ω)1−F (ω∗) ≡ p˜. We
can then rewrite the posterior beliefs on managerial ability as follows:
γr ≡ P(θ = h |x = g, s = g) =
= ρ
´
ω
ω∗ P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = h) p(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´ ω
ω∗ P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = i) p(ω) dF (ω)
= ραh
α
γ0 ≡ P(θ = h | s = b) =
= ρ
´ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |ω, θ = h) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |ω, θ = i) dF (ω)
= ρ(1− αh)p˜+ βh(1− p˜)(1− α)p˜+ β(1− p˜)
γl ≡ P(θ = h |x = b, s = g) =
= ρ
´ ω
ω∗ P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = h) (1− p(ω)) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´ ω
ω∗ P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = i) (1− p(ω)) dF (ω)
= ρ1− βh1− β
In general, while every equilibrium features a cutoff strategy, the cutoff is not nec-
essarily unique. This happens because, while the expected payoff from choosing
the risky project is increasing with ω, the expected reputation might be a decreas-
ing function of it. In some situations, summarized in the following result, however,
we can find sufficient conditions that guarantee a unique equilibrium cutoff.
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Corollary 1. If 1−αh
βh
> 1−αl
βl
and ∀λ < λ˜, the equilibrium cutoff is unique.
2.3 Efficiency
In this section we show that our economy is intrinsically plagued by inefficient
managerial investment decisions. To estabilish this, first recall the result in ex-
pression 2, stating that the first best project selection rule requires to undertake
the risky project if only if ω ≥ ωFB. Therefore, since in the previous subsection
we proved that equilibria are characterized by cutoffs, making welfare considera-
tions about the level of risk taking in the economy boils down to comparing the
initial signal of the marginal manager in equilibrium, ω∗, to the optimal ωFB. The
marginal manager takes on too much or not enough risk depending on the possibil-
ity of exploiting a reputational gain or avoiding a reputational loss, by undertaking
the risky task. What matters is the wedge between what he and the market will
think about his ability in running experiments. If his expected self-assessment is
higher than the expectations of the market, the manager will be more cautious and
choose the safe project. If, instead, he is less optimistic than the market about
the probability of being perceived as high type, he chooses the risky task, even
if efficiency requires the safe one. The second possibility arises when discarding
risky projects is perceived by the market as a good signal about the managerial
ability.
We start with a technical result, that helps to understand how different equilibria
induce different market posteriors upon abandoning a risky project. It establishes
conditions so that reputation following abandonment is higher, the higher is the
market belief on the good state of the world.
Lemma 1. γ0(ω∗) is increasing (decreasing) in ω∗ if and only if 1−αH
βH
> (<)1−α
β
This result holds because while the threshold ω∗ at which the VC is indifferent
between the safe and risky project increases, the market becomes more and more
optimistic about the state of the world. In this circumstance, a suspension of a
risky task is increasingly associated to an error in the good state - which happens,
on average, with probability 1 − α - rather than to a correct forecast when the
state of the world is bad - which happens with probability β. The market is thus
willing to believe that the manager is a high type when incorrectly discarding is a
more salient behaviour of high types rather than low types managers, relative to
how often the two correctly abandon the risky project.
As there is a one-to-one correspondence between ω and p(ω), in the previous
Lemma we could have used the probability p(ω∗) rather than the initial signal on
the state of the world, ω∗. Since the marginal manager (the one whose ω = ω∗)
is less optimistic than the market about the state of the world (as p(ω∗) < p˜) the
previous Lemma also suggests that the self-assessment of the marginal manager,
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upon discarding the risky task, ρ (1−αH)p(ω∗)+βH(1−p(ω∗))(1−α)p(ω∗)+β(1−p(ω∗)) , is lower than the market
posterior, ρ (1−αH)p˜+βH(1−p˜)(1−α)p˜+β(1−p˜) , if and only if
1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
. Viceversa the manager and
the market would share the same posteriors in the events of success and failure of
the risky project, as these beliefs are independent on the initial signal on the state
of the world. The next result, thus, follows:
Lemma 2. The marginal manager’s expectation of his reputation induced by risk
taking is higher than the prior if and only if 1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
.
The intuition for this result goes as follows. By the law of iterated expectations,
conditional on his information, a manager’s expected self-assesment is equal to the
prior. However, in computing what his reputation will be, the manager takes into
account that the posterior he and the market will form might not coincide when
some additional asymmetry of information is still present. But when is this so? In
those cases where the uncertainty about the state of the world is resolved by the
manager’s action, that is, when the manager gets a good signal in the experiment
and pursues the risky project till the end, the manager and the market share the
posterior beliefs on the manager’s type. After all, conditional on the state of the
world, the initial signal ω provides no extra help in figuring out the manager’s type.
This is because in the first stage all managers are equally good and receive the
initial signal from the same distribution. In case the project succeeds the posterior
is ραH
α
, while it is ρ (1−βH)(1−β) if the project fails, independently on ω. Instead, when
the manager discards the risky task after observing the outcome of the experiment,
agents do not know if the project has been interrupted correctly or not. In this
scenario, the manager and the market use their different beliefs on the state of the
world, p(ω∗) and p˜ respectively, to draw a conclusion about the manager’s type.
The direction of disagreement in this event is disciplined by the condition provided
in Lemma 1. When 1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
holds, γ0 grows with p (ω), because getting the
bad signal by mistake is more typical of an high type.
From this, it follows that the expected reputation induced by taking risk is higher,
giving the marginal agent a strict additional gain from taking risk.
This also means that, in order for him to be indifferent, the project must be worse
than the one equalizing monetary payoffs.
With the last Lemma at hand, we are now ready to state our main result providing
conditions on the direction of the distortions associated to career concerns.
Proposition 2. There is over(under) risk-taking in the economy if and only if
1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
(1−αH
βH
< 1−α
β
).
To prove this result, we argue that the marginal individual chooses the risky project
when the first best would require the safe one. Then we use the fact that any
manager receiving the signal ω, where ω > ω∗, is also taking the risky project. By
definition of first best, an manager should choose the risky project if and only if
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ω > ωFB. At the cutoff ωFB, the expected profit from choosing the safe project is
identical to the expected profit when choosing the risky one, that is
(1− λ)κvs = (1− λ)κ(p(ωFB)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ωFB))(1− β)c)
By definition, the marginal manager is indifferent between the safe and the risky
projects when also the expected reputation is taken into account, that is:
(1− λ)κvs + λρ = (1− λ)κ(p(ω∗)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ω∗))(1− β)c) + λE(γ | ω∗)
We put the two conditions together to get:
(1− λ)κ
pi(risk | ωFB)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p(ωFB)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ωFB))(1− β)c) +λρ = (1− λ)κvs + λρ
and the right hand side is in turn equal to:
(1− λ)κ (p(ω∗)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ω∗))(1− β)c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(risk | ω∗)
+λE(γ | ω∗)
As E(γ | ω∗) > ρ, it must be the case that pi(risk | ωFB) > pi(risk | ω∗). pi(ω, risk)
is an increasing function of ω because p(ω) is increasing in ω. This is equivalent
to ωFB > ω∗.
Our inefficiency result derives from the wedge between what the manager and
the market think about the managerial capability in running experiments, that
arises when the risky project is abandoned. Career concerns, in turn, have a bite
in the managerial decision problem, because of the expected reputational gains or
losses from choosing the risky task. Technically, this gains or losses emerge because
the players cannot condition on the state of the world, x = {g, b}, in evaluating
γ0 ≡ P(θ = h | s = b). In particular, the market conditions this inference on the
equilibrium strategy profile, whereas the VC bases it on his observed signal ω. If
the counterfactual state of the world in case of a bad draw in the experiment was
observed, that is, if players observed what would have happened if the manager
continued with the risky task, the expected reputation would coincide with the
expected self-assessment, equal to the prior.5 Similarly, if the VC did not have
any private information on ω, no disagreement on γ0 would result. In both these
cases, no inefficiency would emerge.
5To see this, we just need to compute the posteriors in case players know that the manager
was wrong in discarding the risky project, ρ 1−αH1−α , and when the manager was right in doing that,
ρβ
H
β . As none of the posterior would now depend on p(ω) and p˜, the expected reputation and the
expected self-assessment would coincide and be equal to p(ω)αραHα + (1− p(ω)(1− β)ρ (1−β
H)
(1−β) +
p(ω)(1 − α)ρ 1−αH1−α + (1 − p(ω))βρβ
H
β = ρ, ∀ω. This would also be true, in particular, for the
marginal manager.
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Notice that if the good manager is better in running experiments in both states
of the world, that is αh > αl and βh > βl, then 1−α
H
βH
> 1−α
β
never holds. In this
scenario, as the following result states, the agents do not take enough risk.
Corollary 2. If αh > αl and βh > βl there is underinvestment in the risky activity.
2.4 How Robust is It to Signalling at the Experimentation
Stage?
In the analysis so far, we have assumed that the outcome of the experiment is public
information. This makes it compelling that a manager would follow the informative
experiment and continue with the risky project if and only if the signal turns out
to be good. However, one might argue that the action at the experimentation
stage - whether or not to abandon the project - could be itself a signalling device,
in case the experiment outcome is the manager’s private information. In this
paragraph we argue that, as long as the career concerns motive is not too strong,
our main results are robust to adding this additional channel. That is, the unique
equilibrium would be a separating equilibrium where managers follow the signal.
To see this, let us analyse the subgame where the manager has chosen the
risky project, and he has (privately) observed the signal s. If we can show that
the equilibrium in this signalling game is one where managers follow the signal,
conditional on any ω, then we can conclude that our main results on risk taking
behavior still hold. The reason is that in such equilibrium managers would play
exactly as they are constrained to do by assumption in our original model.
Let us start focusing on the two possible pooling equilibria. First, consider
the case where all managers - independently on s - abandon a project after the
experiment. A manager that received s = g, would not deviate if and only if:
(1− λ) ∗ 0 + λρ ≥ (1− λ)
[
αp (ω)
αp (ω) + (1− β) (1− p (ω))vr − c
]
+ λγ˜
for some induced posterior - γ˜ - that is computed by specifying arbitrary off-
equilibrium beliefs on s. By the parameters restrictions as in section 2.1, it is easy
to observe that the condition can not be satisfied as long as λ is small enough, for
any γ˜ ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly, consider the case where all managers - independently on s - continue
with the project after the experiment. In this case a manager with s = b would
not deviate if and only if:
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(1− λ)
[
(1− α) p (ω)
(1− α) p (ω) + β (1− p (ω))vr − c
]
+ λρ ≥ (1− λ) ∗ 0 + λγ˜
for some γ˜ ∈ [0, 1]. Again, this is impossible due to the same restrictions, when λ
is small enough.
Finally, consider instead a candidate separating equilibrium where the manager
continues with the risky project if and only if s = g. Here - due to our restrictions
- a manager that is solely interested in the material payoffs would want to continue
when s = g and abandon when s = b. Therefore, since the expected reputation is
bounded above by one and below by zero, such equilibrium must exist for some λ
small enough.
3 An Extension: N Agents
In this section, we generalize the model by increasing the number of managers to
N > 1. The structure of the economy is the same of the one analyzed above,
although we need some extra assumptions about the timing of the managerial
investments, the initial signals ω and the experiments in case of risky project.
As for the timing of the economy, we assume that each player observe the final
outcome of each investment simultaneously.6 We also assume that the managers
share the same signal ω. With this assumption it follows that either all managers
choose the safe project, or they all choose the risky one. As for the experiments,
we assume that the realizations are independent across managers, conditionally on
the state of the world and their types.
It is easy to observe that, also in the extended model, the efficient rule is
the same of the simple model with one manager and also the cutoff strategy in
equilibrium, when λ < λ˜, holds as before. Once again, we focus on this case.
Note that, with N managers, the following three facts become relevant. First,
the market and a manager discarding the risky project after the experiment get
to know that the state of the world is bad if at least an other manager pursues
the investment and this fails. Similarly, they realize that the state of the world
is good after suspending the project if there is at least a manager that continues
and succeeds. In these two cases their assessment about the managerial ability
coincide, as they now condition on the state of the world, rather than on their
(different) probabilities of being in either state, pinned down by p(ω∗) and p˜.
Third, even when all managers abandon the risky project after the experiment,
and hence there is still uncertainty about the true state of the world, the posterior
that market forms is a function of the number of managers in the economy. Indeed,
6The fact that other managers observe the various outcomes is irrelevant. What matters is
that the market observe the realizations of the various projects.
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the odds that all managers are right or wrong in receiving a bad signal from the
experiment differ to the chance that only one of them receives the bad signal in
either state of the world.
As the manager’s type is independent on the signal ω, conditionally on the
realization of the experiment and the state of the world, if a manager pursues the
risky investment and succeeds the posterior of the market coincides with γr; if he
fails the posterior equals γl. Through this section we rename the posteriors that
coincide with the previous analysis as γrN and γlN , respectively. There are other
three sets of events inducing different posteriors to the market on a manager’s
ability. One corresponds to the situation in which the manager abandoned the
risky project, but at least another manager pursued it and failed. The second
one happens when the manager abandoned the risky project, but at least another
manager pursued it and succeeded. Finally, the third refers to the case in which
all managers abandoned the risky project. We denote γnlN , γnrN and γ0N the market
posteriors associated to each of these three sets of events. The market’s posteriors
about the quality of the N th manager, taking as given the performance of the other
N − 1 managers are, therefore, given by:
γnlN ≡ P(θN = h |x = b, sN = b) = ρ
βh
β
γnrN ≡ P(θN = h |x = g, sN = b) = ρ
1− αh
1− α
γ0N ≡ P(θN = h | sN = b, s1,...,N−1 = b) = ρ
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
γrN ≡ P(θN = h |x = g, sN = g) = ρ
αh
α
γlN ≡ P(θN = h |x = b, sN = g) = ρ
1− βh
1− β
We first establish a result that mirrors the one in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. For any finite number of managers, N, the marginal manager
takes too much risk if and only if 1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
.
Also in the new economy, there are circumstances in which the market cannot
condition the analysis on whether the project was to deliver returns or not, upon
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observing that the manager got a bad signal from the experiment. Once again, the
posterior on manager’s ability in this event is the only one where two observers
with different opinions on the state of the world would disagree on. As the market
is more optimistic on the state of the world compared to the marginal manager,
the latter enjoys a reputational benefit or suffers a cost when choosing the risky
project, depending on whether the abandonment of it is perceived as a good signal
for the market about his quality.
We are interested in comparing economies that differ in N - the number of
managers running projects that are linked to the same state of the world. In
particular, we want to assess which economies are more plagued by the inefficiency
that inevitably results from the pressure of career concerns. To do this, one first
observation to be made is that, provided the direction of the inefficiency is the
same, it is possible to measure how “strong” is the inefficiency by only looking
at how distant is the cutoff associated to the equilibrium marginal manager from
the first best value - ωFB. This is stated formally in the next Lemma and further
explained in the following lines.
Lemma 3. Take two economies - denoted 1 and 2 - and associated equilibrium
cutoffs ω∗1 and ω∗2. (i) If, 1−α
H
βH
> 1−α
β
the expected monetary payoff from economy
1 is higher than in economy 2 whenever ω∗1 > ω∗2. (ii) If, 1−α
H
βH
< 1−α
β
the expected
monetary payoff from economy 1 is higher than in economy 2 whenever ω∗1 < ω∗2.
To prove this result, consider the case when 1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
. We know in this
case equilibria will exhibit excessive risk taking, therefore the cutoffs ω∗1 and ω∗2
would be both lower than ωFB. Assume now ω∗1 > ω∗2. We can compare the
equilibrium monetary payoffs for each realization of the initial signal ω . To do
this, we identify three regions. When ω < ω∗2, managers in both economies follow
the efficient decision, that is, select the safe project. When ω > ω∗1, managers
in the two economies take the risky project. When ω∗2 ≤ ω ≤ ω∗1, managers in
economy 2 are selecting the risky project, whereas those in economy 1 choose the
safe alternative. Since the first best solution prescribes to select the safe project
in these cases, it follows that returns are lower in economy 2 for any realization of
ω within this region. Therefore, when taking expectations over all possible values
of ω, the monetary payoff is higher in economy 1. The same logic applies to the
case when 1−αH
βH
< 1−α
β
.
The result is useful because it provides us with a simple way to compare differ-
ent economies in terms of how inefficient is project selection in equilibrium: it is
sufficient to establish in which economy the marginal managers departs less from
the indifferent one in the first best - absent the career concerns motive.
In the following, main result of this section, we show that the inefficiency de-
creases as the number of managers increases. Economies where N is larger induce
equilibria in which expected returns are higher.
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Proposition 4. The inefficiency is monotonically decreasing in the number of
managers, N.
In the proof of this Proposition, we show that E(γN+1 | ω∗) < E(γN | ω∗) if
1−αh
βh
> 1−αl
βl
, while E(γN+1 | ω∗) > E(γN | ω∗) whenever 1−αhβh <
1−αl
βl
. That
is, the marginal manager in the economy with N +1 managers finds less appealing
to invest in the risky activity from a career perspective, compared to the same
individual in the economy with N managers, exactly when there is a reputational
gain by choosing it. Instead, the risky task is now becoming more appealing when
it is associated to a reputational disadvantage. This clearly implies that the bite
of career concerns is more loose and that the marginal individual is characterized
by a signal ω∗ closer to the first best cutoff, ωFB.
The following Proposition states that in the limit the inefficiency disappears.
Proposition 5. As the number of managers, N, goes to infinity, the inefficiency
disappears. That is, ω∗ approaches ωFB.
The proof of this result is very simple. Consider the expected reputation of the
marginal manager, that we now denote E(γN | ω∗):
E(γN | ω∗) ≡ p(ω∗)αρα
H
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− β
H)
(1− β) +
+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)ρ1− αh1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)ρβh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
As 1 − α and β are numbers in the interval [0, 1], (1 − α − (1 − α)N) and (1 −
(1−β)−βN) tend to (1−α) and β, respectively. Furthermore, since the posterior
belief associated to the event in which all managers suspend the investment in
the risky project, (1−αh)(1−α)N−1p˜+βhβN−1(1−p˜)(1−α)N p˜+βN (1−p˜) , is also in the interval [0, 1], and the
weight on this posterior approaches 0, we have that the following result:
lim
N→∞
E(γN | ω∗) = p(ω∗)αρα
H
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− β
H)
(1− β) +
+ p(ω∗)(1− α)ρ1− αh1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))βρβh
β
= ρ
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This implies that the marginal manager has no reputational gain in expectations by
choosing the risky task. Therefore ω∗ and ωFB must coincide and the inefficiency
disappears.
The intuition behind this Proposition is straightforward. When the number
of managers tends to infinity, the chance for the market not to observe the coun-
terfactual state of the world, that occurs when all managers abandon the risky
project, approaches zero. This is so because, when the state of the world is good,
it is very unlikely that every manager has, incorrectly, a bad draw in the experi-
ment. In contrast, when the state of the world is bad, it is very likely that at least
one agent receives by mistake the signal to pursue the investment. In the limit,
therefore, the wedge between the managers’ self assessments and their expected
reputations vanishes.
4 Conclusion
In this Chapter we proposed a setting where information about a manager’s ability
is imperfect and managers are interested in their reputation. Motivated by the
application to investments in young firms, we modeled managers as agents that
create value because they can experiment and learn about a projects potential.
As it is greatly emphasized by, among others, Kerr et al. (2014), the ability to
learn about a project’s profitability at relatively early stages is a skill that venture
capitalists must have in order to succeed in the industry. Infact, experimentation
is desirable to the extent that it provides the incentive to finance innovative and
young firms. However, it is reasonable to think that some venture capitalists
are better at extracting information from early experiments than others. If this
skill is so important, then naturally venture capitalists would benefit from making
investors and entrepreneurs believe that they are good in this dimension. It would
increase their bargaining power, and help them find better deals at the fundraising
stage. In light of this observation, we studied a manager’s incentive to take on risk
when career concerns are at play, that is, outside observers are learning about his
ability to experiment. Contrary to Holmstro¨m (1999), where managers add value
because they directly increase a project’s success rate and in equilibrium they
become too risk-averse, managers in this model might take inefficiently high risk.
The reason is that the abandonment of a promising project at an intermediate
stage might be good news about the agent’s ability. In particular, this is the case
when a good manager is typically one whose experimenting technology is biased
towards receiving negative outcomes. In this situation a manager would tend to
opt excessively for risky, experimental business strategies, in anticipation of the
reputational gain that comes from cutting off the investment at an intermediate
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stage. This result provides a somewhat darker point of view on the amount of
experimentation and risk observed in the venture capital industry. We studied one
solution to this problem in one extension of the model, where we show that when
the observer gets information about the outcome of similar projects, the inefficiency
is reduced. The reason is that what drives the inefficiency is the fact that the
observer can’t distinguish whether a project was abandoned because doomed to
fail or due to a false negative in the experiment. The information from similar
projects provides the observer with an imperfect signal about the counterfactual.
It is usually argued that when agents interact less frequently, career concerns
are more severe. Translated into the example of the venture capital industry,
one would expect younger VC firms’ decision to be particularly distorted. The
novel empirical implication of our model is that the markets more plagued by
career concerns distortions are those where agents engage in more unique and less
correlated activities.
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Appendix
Beliefs
γr ≡ P(θ = h |x = g, s = g) = P(θ = h, x = g, s = g)
P(x = g, s = g) =
=
´ =P(θ=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θ = h |ω) P(x = g, s = g |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
´
P(θ = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θ=i)
P(x = g, s = g |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω) =
= ρ Ω P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = h)
=P(x=g |ω)=p(ω)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(x = g |ω, θ = h) σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´
P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = i) P(x = g |ω, θ = i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(x=g |ω)=p(ω)
σ(ω) dF (ω)
γ0 ≡ P(θ = h | s = b) = P(θ = h, s = b)
P(s = b)
=
´ =P(θ=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θ = h |ω) P(s = b |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
´
P(θ = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θ=i)
P(s = b |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω) =
= ρ
´
P(s = b |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´
P(s = b |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
γl ≡ P(θ = h |x = b, s = g) = P(θ = h, x = b, s = g)
P(x = b, s = g) =
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=
´ =P(θ=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θ = h |ω) P(x = b, s = g |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
´
P(θ = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θ=i)
P(x = b, s = g |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω) =
= ρ Ω P(x = b, s = g |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´
P(x = b, s = g |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω) =
= ρ
´
P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = h)
P(x=b |ω)=1−p(ω)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(x = b |ω, θ = h) σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
´
P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = i) P(x = b |ω, θ = i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(x=b |ω)=1−p(ω)
σ(ω) dF (ω)
Proof of Proposition 1. The expected utility of the agent with signal ω when
choosing the risky project is
(1− λ)κ (p(ω)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ω))(1− β)c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(risk | ω)
+λE(γ | ω)
We define ω∗ as the signal that equalizes the managerial expected utilities when
choosing the safe or the risky project
(1− λ)κvs + λρ = (1− λ)κ (p(ω∗)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ω∗))(1− β)c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(risk | ω∗)
+λE(γ | ω∗)
It is sufficient to prove that the expected utility when choosing the risky project
is an increasing function of ω. Notice that as p(ω) is increasing, the expected
payoff pi(risk | ω) is also growing with ω. For the whole utility to be increasing
in ω, either E(γ | ω) must be an increasing function of ω or the positive effect on
pi(risk | ω) must be larger than the negative one on E(γ | ω). We study separately
the sufficient conditions for these two cases.
Case 1 : We can rewrite the expected reputation of a generic agent whose signal
is ω, when choosing the risky project, as
E(γ | ω) ≡ p(ω)ραH + (1− p(ω))ρ(1− βH)+
+(p(ω)(1− α) + (1− p(ω))β)
´
σ(l)=1 ρ((1− αh)p(l) + βh(1− p(l)))dF (l)´
σ(l)=1(1− α)p(l) + β(1− p(l))dF (l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡γ0(risky)
We can thus rewrite the expected reputation as the sum of two components: one
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independent on ω, the other one dependent on it
independent of ω︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ(1− βH) + βγ0(risky) +p(ω)(ρ (αH + βH − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+γ0(risky) (1− α− β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
)
As p(ω), is increasing, the expected reputation is increasing in ω if and only if
ρ(αH + βH − 1) + γ0(w∗)(1− α− β) > 0
Using the definition of γ0(w∗), we can express this condition as:
ρ(αH + βH − 1) +
´
σ(l)=1 ρ((1− αh)p(l) + βh(1− p(l))dF (l)´
σ(l)=1(1− α)p(l) + β(1− p(l))dF (l)
(1− α− β) > 0
This is equivalent to
ρ´
σ(l)=1(1− α)p(l) + β(1− p(l))dF (l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
×
×
ˆ
σ(l)=1
(αH + βH − 1)((1− α)p(l) + β(1− p(l)))dF (l)+
+
ˆ
σ(l)=1
(1− α− β)((1− αH)p(l) + βH(1− p(l)))dF (l)
 > 0
This is true if and only if
1− αH
βH
<
1− α
β
.
Case 2 : When the expected reputation is decreasing in ω, we can nonetheless look
for conditions that guarantee that the positive derivative of the expected payoff
with respect to ω, when choosing the risky project, dominates.
In a similar way to what we did before, we express the portion of the managerial
utility depending on his expected reputation as
λ
( independent of ω︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− βH)ρ+ βγ0(ω∗) +p(ω)(ρ
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(αH + βH − 1) +γ0(ω∗)
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α− β))
)
When ρ(αH + βH − 1) + γ0(w∗)(1 − α − β) < 0, the derivative of this expression
with respect to ω cannot be lower than λp′(ω)(ρ(αH + βH − 1) + (1− α− β)), as
γ0(w∗) ∈ [ 0, 1] .
The derivative of the part of the utility function related to the return on the risky
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project is, instead,
(1− λ)κ(p′(ω)α(vr − c) + p′(ω)(1− β)c) > 0.
For the whole managerial utility to be an increasing function of ω it is then suffi-
cient that
(1− λ)κ(p′(ω)α(vr − c) + p′(ω)(1− β)c > −λp′(ω) (ρ(αH + βH − 1) + (1− α− β))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ραH+ρβH−ρ+1−ραH−(1−ρ)αL−ρβH−(1−ρ)βL
that is, whenever:
λ
1− λ <
κ(α(vr − c) + (1− β)c)
(1− ρ)(αL + βL − 1) .
To sum up, whenever 1−αH
βH
< 1−α
β
the manager is better off choosing the risky
project if and only if his signal ω is bigger than the equilibrium ω∗. When 1−αH
βH
>
1−α
β
, this is also true if career concerns are not too strong, that is λ is small enough.

Proof of Lemma 1. Consider two cutoff equilibria characterized by thresholds
w∗1 and w∗2, with w∗1 > w∗2. Let us consider the conditions that guarantee that
γ0(w∗1) > γ0(w∗2). These are the beliefs in case a risky project is abandoned, under
the two equilibria. We study in which circumstances the following holds:
γ0(w∗1) ≡
´ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(w) + βh(1− p(w)))dF (w)´ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(w) + β(1− p(w)))dF (w)
>
´ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(w) + βh(1− p(w)))dF (w)´ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(w) + β(1− p(w)))dF (w) ≡ γ
0(w∗2)
As the two denominators are non negative, this is equivalent to:
(
ˆ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(w) + β(1− p(w)))dF (w))(
ˆ w
w∗1
((1− αh)p(w) + βh(1− p(w)))dF (w))
>
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(
ˆ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(w) + β(1− p(w)))dF (w))(
ˆ w
w∗2
((1− αh)p(w) + βh(1− p(w)))dF (w))
Using the definitions of α and β, that is, α ≡ ραH + (1 − ρ)αL and β ≡ ρβH +
(1− ρ)βL, we can rewrite this expression as:
((1− α)βh − β(1− αh))
ˆ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗1
(1− p(w))dF (w)
>
((1− α)βh − β(1− αh))
ˆ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗2
(1− p(w))dF (w)
Suppose now that (1 − α)βh ≤ β(1 − αh) - which is equivalent to (1 − αl)βh ≤
βl(1− αh)). Then the inequality holds if and only if:
ˆ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗1
(1− p(w))dF (w) <
ˆ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗2
(1− p(w))dF (w)
that is, if and only if
ˆ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗1
dF (w)−
ˆ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
<
ˆ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗2
dF (w)−
ˆ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
As the second terms on each side of the inequality are the same, this simplifies to:
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(1− F (w∗1))
ˆ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w) < (1− F (w∗2))
ˆ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w).
Because p(w) < p(w∗1) for any w < w∗1, notice that the left hand side of this
inequality is at most:
(1− F (w∗1))(F (w∗1)− F (w∗2))p(w∗1) + (1− F (w∗1))
ˆ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)− 1
for some 1 > 0. Therefore, the inequality necessarily holds if the following holds:
(1− F (w∗1))(F (w∗1)− F (w∗2))p(w∗1)− 1 < (F (w∗1)− F (w∗2))
ˆ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w).
The right hand side of this equation cannot be lower than (F (w∗1) − F (w∗2))(1 −
F (w∗1))p(w∗1) + 2 for some 2 > 0. Therefore this condition always holds and
γ0(w∗1) > γ0(w∗2) when (1− αl)βh ≤ βl(1− αh).
With a similar argument we could show that the opposite is true when (1−αl)βh ≥
βl(1− αh). 
Proof of Corollary 1. Let ω∗1 and ω∗2 be two equilibrium cutoffs, such that
ω∗1 > ω
∗
2. By definition it must be the case that the expected utilities of the two
marginal individuals choosing the risky project equals the utility when choosing
the safe one
(1− λ)κ(vs − c) + λρ
=
(1− λ)κ((p(ω∗1)α(vr − c) + (1− p(ω1))(1− β)(−c) + λ(p(ω∗1)ραh + (1− p(ω∗1))ρ(1− βh)+
+(p(ω∗1)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗1))β)
´ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)´ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω) )
=
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(1− λ)κ((p(ω∗2)α(vr − c) + (1− p(ω∗2))(1− β)(−c) + λ(p(ω∗2)ραh + (1− p(ω∗2))ρ(1− βh)+
+(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β)
´ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)´ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω) )
For this to hold, it must be the case that:
(1− λ)
λ
κ((p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))α(vr − c) + (p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))(1− β)c)+
+(p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))ραh − (p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))ρ(1− βh)
=
(p(ω∗1)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗1))β)
´ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (w)´ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω) +
−(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β)
´ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)´ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω) (4)
Notice that the left hand side of equation (4) is negative, as p(ω∗2) < p(ω∗1) and
αh + βh − 1 > 0.
As p(ω∗1) ≡ p(ω∗2) + (p(ω∗1) − p(ω∗2)) > p(ω∗2), we can now rewrite the right hand
side of (4) as:
(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β + (p(ω∗1)− p(ω∗2))(1− α− β)))×
×
´ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)´ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω) +
−(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β)
´ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)´ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
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and then as:
(p(ω∗1)− p(ω∗2))(1− α− β))
´ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)´ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω) +
+(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β)×
×(
´ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)´ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω) −
´ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)´ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω) )
The first part of this term is negative as α + β > 1 and it is bounded below by
(p(ω∗1)− p(ω∗2))(1− α− β), as γ0(ω∗1) ∈ [0, 1].
By the previous Lemma the second part is positive if and only if (1 − αl)βh ≤
βl(1 − αh). In this scenario, the right hand side of equation (4) has a negative
component and a positive one. Thus, if (1 − αl)βh ≤ βl(1 − αh), (4) cannot hold
whenever:
(1− λ)κ((p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))α(vr − c) + (p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1)(1− β)c)+
+λ((p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))ραh − (p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))ρ(1− βh))
<
λ(p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))(α + β − 1).
This is equivalent to:
(1− λ)κ(α(vr − c) + (1− β)c) + λρ(αh + βh − 1)) > λ(α + β − 1)
and, after simplification, to:
λ
1− λ <
κ(α(vr − c) + (1− β)c)
(1− ρ)(αl + βl − 1) .

Proof of Lemma 2. The proof of this Lemma is straightforward. Assume
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1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
. For the marginal manager, the expected reputation is given by:
E(γ | ω∗) = p(ω∗)αρα
H
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− β
H)
(1− β) +
+(p(ω∗)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗))β)ρ(1− α
H)p˜+ βH(1− p˜)
(1− α)p˜+ β(1− p˜)
>
p(ω∗)αρα
H
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− β
H)
(1− β) +
+(p(ω∗)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗))β)ρ(1− α
H)p(ω∗) + βH(1− p(ω∗))
(1− α)p(ω∗) + β(1− p(ω∗)) = ρ
On the left hand side of the inequality we have the expected reputation of the
marginal individual, upon observing ω∗ and choosing the risky project. On the
right hand side we have his expected self-assessment. Notice that since the signal
ω is independent of the manager’s type, his expected self-assessment - at any ω
- equals, of course, the prior, ρ. This is an immediate consequence of the law of
iterated expectations. 
Additional Beliefs With N Agents
γnlN ≡ P(θN = h |x = b, s = b) =
´ ω
ω∗ P(θN = h, x = b, s = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)´ ω
ω∗ P(x = b, s = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)
=
=
´ ω
ω∗
=P(θ=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θN = h |ω) P(x = b, s = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
´ ω
ω∗ P(θN = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θN=i)
P(x = b, s = b |ω, θN = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
= ρ
´ ω
ω∗ P(x = b, s = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θN = i)
´ ω
ω∗ P(x = b, s = b |ω, θN = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
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= ρ
´ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |x = b, ω, θ = h)
=P(x=b |ω)=p(ω)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(x = b |ω, θN = h) σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θN = i)
´ ω
ω∗(s = b |x = b, ω, θN = i) P(x = b |ω, θN = i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(x=b |ω)=p(ω)
σ(ω) dF (ω)
= ρβh
β
γ0N ≡ P(θN = h | sN = b, s1 = b, ..., sN−1 = b) =
P(θN = h, s1 = b, ..., sN = b)
P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b)
=
=
´ ω
ω∗ P(θN = h, s1 = b, ..., sN = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)´ ω
ω∗ P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)
=
=
´ ω
ω∗
=P(θN=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θN = h |ω) P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
´ ω
ω∗ P(θN = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θN=i)
P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |ω, θN = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
Notice that P(s1 = b, .., sN = b |ω, θ = i) can be computed as:
P(s1 = b, .., sN = b |x = g, ω, θ = i)P(x = g|ω, θN = i) +
+P(s1 = b, .., sN = b|x = b, ω, θ = i)P(x = b|ω, θN = i) .
(5)
Now, the first term of equation (5) - P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |x = g, ω, θN = i) - is:
P(sN = b |s1 = b, ..., sN−1 = b, x = g, ω, θN = i)P(s1 = b, ..., sN−1 = b |x = g, ω, θN = i)×
×P(sN = b |x = g, θN = i)P(sN−1 = b |x = g)...P(s1 = b |x = g) =
= (1− αi)(1− α)N−1.
Similarly, the second term of (5) can be computed as P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |x =
b, ω, θN = i) = βiβN−1. Thus, we have:
γ0N = ρ
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1p(ω) + βhβN−1(1− p(ω))
(1− α)Np(ω) + βN(1− p(ω))
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γnrN ≡ P(θN = h |x = g, s = b) =
´ ω
ω∗ P(θN = h, x = g, s = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)´ ω
ω∗ P(x = g, s = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)
=
=
´ ω
ω∗
=P(θN=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θN = h |ω) P(x = g, s = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
´ ω
ω∗ P(θN = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θN=i)
P(x = g, s = b |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω) =
= ρ
´ ω
ω∗ P(x = g, s = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θN = i)
´ ω
ω∗ P(x = g, s = b |ω, θN = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
= ρ
´ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |x = g, ω, θ = h)
P(x=g |ω)=p(ω)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(x = g |ω, θN = h) σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θN = i)
´ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |x = g, ω, θN = i) P(x = g |ω, θN = i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(x=g |ω)=p(ω)
σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
= ρ1− αh1− α .
Proof of Proposition 3. We start showing that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 also
hold in the generalized version of the model.
Consider, again, two cutoff equilibria characterized by thresholds w∗1 and w∗2,
with w∗1 > w∗2. We want to show that γ0(w∗1) > γ0(w∗2) if and only if 1−α
H
βH
> 1−α
β
.
In doing this, we use the new definition of belief in case of termination of the risky
project. γ0(w∗1) > γ0(w∗2) when:
ρ
´ ω
ω∗1
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1p(w) + βhβN−1(1− p(w))dF (w)´ ω
ω∗1
((1− α)Np(w) + βN(1− p(w)))dF (w)
>
ρ
´ ω
ω∗2
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1p(w) + βhβN−1(1− p(w))dF (w)´ ω
ω∗2
(1− α)Np(w) + βN(1− p(w))dF (w)
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This is equivalent to:
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1βN
ˆ ω
ω∗1
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ ω
ω∗2
(1− p(w))dF (w) +
+ (1− α)NβhβN−1
ˆ ω
ω∗1
(1− p(w))dF (w)
ˆ ω
ω∗2
p(w)dF (w)
>
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1βN
ˆ ω
ω∗1
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ ω
ω∗2
(1− p(w))dF (w) +
+ (1− α)NβhβN−1
ˆ ω
ω∗1
(1− p(w))dF (w)
ˆ ω
ω∗2
p(w)dF (w)
We now divide everything by (1− α)N−1βN−1 and rearrange, to get:
((1− α)βh − β(1− αh))
ˆ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗1
(1− p(w))dF (w)
>
((1− α)βh − β(1− αh))
ˆ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
ˆ w
w∗2
(1− p(w))dF (w)
This is equivalent to what we had in the proof of Lemma 1. Therefore for w∗1 and
w∗2, with w∗1 > w∗2, we have that γ0(w∗1) > γ0(w∗2) if and only if 1−α
H
βH
> 1−α
β
.
Now we need to show that, as in Lemma 2, upon observing ω∗ the marginal
agent is less optimistic than the principal in evaluating his own ability if and only
if 1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
. The proof of this claim is straightforward. Suppose 1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
.
Notice that, for the marginal agent:
E(γ | ω∗) ≡ p(ω∗)αρα
H
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− β
H)
(1− β) +
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+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)ρ1− αh1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)ρβh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
>
p(ω∗)αρα
H
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− β
H)
(1− β) +
+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)ρ1− αh1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)ρβh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p(ω∗) + βhβN−1(1− p(ω∗))
(1− α)Np(ω∗) + βN(1− p(ω∗)) = ρ
Hence, the marginal agent takes too much risk if and only if 1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We start from the definition of E(γN | ω∗) andE(γN+1 | ω∗).
These are, respectively:
E(γN | ω∗) ≡ p(ω∗)αρα
H
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− β
H)
(1− β) +
+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)ρ1− αh1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)ρβh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
and:
E(γN+1 | ω∗) ≡ p(ω∗)αρα
H
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− β
H)
(1− β) +
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+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N+1)ρ1− αh1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN+1)ρβh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N+1 + (1− p(ω∗))βN+1)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N p˜+ βhβN(1− p˜)
(1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜)
We want to show that E(γN | ω∗) > E(γN+1 | ω∗) if and only if 1−αhβh >
1−αl
βl
.
Noticing that the first two addends in the definitions of E(γN | ω∗) andE(γN+1 | ω∗)
coincide and dividing everything by ρ, E(γN | ω∗) > E(γN+1 | ω∗) if and only if
p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)1− αh1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)βh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN) (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
>
p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N+1)1− αh1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN+1)βh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N+1 + (1− p(ω∗))βN+1) (1− αh)(1− α)
N p˜+ βhβN(1− p˜)
(1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜)
Now we multiply everything by
(
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
) (
(1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜)
)
and adjust terms to get
(1− αh)
−p(ω∗)(1− α)N−1α ((1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)) ((1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜))+
+(1− α)N−1p˜
(
(1− α)Np(ω∗) + βN(1− p(ω∗))
) (
(1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜)
)
+
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−(1− α)N p˜
(
(1− α)N+1p(ω∗) + βN+1(1− p(ω∗))
) (
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
)
>
βh
(1− p(ω∗))βN−1(1− β) ((1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)) ((1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜))+
+βN(1− p˜)
(
(1− α)N+1p(ω∗) + βN+1(1− p(ω∗))
) (
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
)
−βN−1(1− p˜)
(
(1− α)Np(ω∗) + βN(1− p(ω∗))
) (
(1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜)
)
We focus separately on the two sides of the inequality. From the left hand side we
obtain:
(1− αh)
−p(ω∗)(1− α)N−1α
(
(1− α)2N+1p˜2 + (1− α)NβN+1p˜(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N+1βN p˜(1− p˜) + β2N+1(1− p˜)2
)
+
+p˜(1− α)N−1
(
(1− α)2N+1p(ω∗)p˜+ (1− α)NβN+1p(ω∗)(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N+1βN p˜(1− p(ω∗)) + β2N+1(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)
+
−p˜(1− α)N
(
(1− α)2N+1p(ω∗)p˜+ (1− α)N+1βNp(ω∗)(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)NβN+1p˜(1− p(ω∗)) + β2N+1(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)=
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= (1− αh)
−α(1− α)2N−1βN+1p(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)+
−α(1− α)2NβNp(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)− α(1− α)N−1β2N+1p(ω∗)(1− p˜)2+
(1− α)2N−1βN+1
(
p(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)− (1− α)(1− p(ω∗))p˜2
)
+
+(1− α)2NβN
(
p˜2(1− p(ω∗))− (1− α)p(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)
)
+
+(1− α)N−1β2N+1
(
p˜(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)− (1− α)p˜(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)=
= (1− αh)
(1− α)2N−1βN+1p˜
(
p(ω∗)(1− p˜)− (1− α)(1− p(ω∗))p˜− αp(ω∗)(1− p˜)
)
+
+(1− α)2NβN p˜
(
p˜(1− p(ω∗)− (1− α)p(ω∗)(1− p˜)− αp(ω∗)(1− p˜)
)
+
+(1− α)N−1β2N+1
(
p˜(1− p(ω∗))− (1− α)p˜(1− p(ω∗))− αp(ω∗)(1− p˜)
)=
= (1− αh)
(1− α)2N−1βN+1p˜
(
(1− α)(p(ω∗)− p˜)
)
+ (1− α)2NβN p˜
(
p˜− p(ω∗)
)
+
+(1− α)N−1β2N+1
(
α(p˜− p(ω∗))
)=
= (1− αh)β(p˜− p(ω∗))
(1− α)2NβN−1(1− β)p˜+ (1− α)N−1βN(1− p˜)α
.
From the hand side, instead, we obtain
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βh
(1− p(ω∗)(1− β)βN−1
(
(1− α)2N+1p˜2 + (1− α)NβN+1p˜(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N−1βN p˜(1− p˜) + β2N+1(1− p˜)2
)
+
+(1− p˜)βN
(
(1− α)2N+1p(ω∗)p˜+ (1− α)N+1βNp(ω∗)(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)NβN+1p˜(1− p(ω∗)) + β2N+1(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)
+
−(1− p˜)βN−1
(
(1− α)2N+1p(ω∗)p˜+ (1− α)NβN+1p(ω∗)(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N+1βN p˜(1− p(ω∗)) + β2N+1(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)=
= βh
(1− α)2N+1(1− β)βN−1(1− p(ω∗))p˜2 + (1− α)N(1− β)β2N(1− p(ω∗))p˜(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N+1(1− β)β2N−1(1− p(ω∗))p˜(1− p˜)+
−(1− α)2N+1(1− β)βN−1p(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)+
−(1− α)Nβ2N(1− p˜)
(
p(ω∗)(1− p˜)− βp˜(1− p(ω∗))
)
+
−(1− α)N+1β2N−1(1− p˜)
(
(1− p(ω∗))p˜− βp(ω∗)(1− p˜)
)=
= βh(1− α)
(1− α)2N(1− β)βN−1
(
p˜2 − p(ω∗)p˜2 − p(ω∗)p˜+ p(ω∗)p˜2
)
+
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+(1− α)N−1β2N(1− p˜)
(
(1− β)(p˜− p(ω∗)p˜)− p(ω∗) + p(ω∗)p˜+ βp˜− βp(ω∗)p˜
)
+
+(1− α)Nβ2N−1(1− p˜)
(
(1− β)(p˜− p(ω∗)p˜)− p˜+ p(ω∗)p˜+ βp(ω∗)− βp(ω∗)p˜
)=
= βh(1− α)
(1− α)2N(1− β)βN−1p˜(p˜− p(ω∗))+
+(1− α)N−1β2N(1− p˜)(p˜− p(ω∗))+
+(1− α)Nβ2N(1− p˜)(p(ω∗)− p˜)
=
= βh(1− α)(p˜− p(ω∗))
(1− α)2NβN−1(1− β)p˜+ (1− α)N−1β2N(1− p˜)α
.
As (p˜− p(ω∗)) and the term in braces are non negative and common between the
left and the right hand side of the original inequality, E(γN | ω∗) > E(γN+1 | ω∗)
if and only if (1−αh)βl > (1−αl)βh. In this case, E(γN | ω∗) > E(γN+1 | ω∗) > ρ,
meaning that the expected reputation of the marginal individual, higher than the
prior, lowers as the number of agents, N, increases. The opposite holds whenever
(1− αh)βl < (1− αl)βh. 
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